State v. Campbell, 243 N.C. App. 563

Background

On 15 August 2012 items (receiver, microphones, audio cords) were stolen from Manna Baptist Church; Pastor Andy Stevens discovered them missing after Sunday service; defendant’s wallet was found in the church.
Defendant was arrested (also charged with a separate breaking/entering) and, during a custodial interview, admitted entering the church and also admitted breaking into a house the same night; he later invoked counsel and then testified at trial that he entered the church seeking water and sanctuary and did not steal.
Trial evidence showed no signs of forced entry; the missing items were never recovered; Pastor Stevens testified in his capacity as church pastor and did not claim personal ownership of the items.
Indictment charged defendant with breaking/entering a place of religious worship with intent to commit larceny and with larceny after breaking or entering, alleging the items were the property of “Andy Stevens and Manna Baptist Church.”
On appeal, this Court initially reversed on two grounds; the N.C. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the indictment facially sufficient and that sufficient evidence supported the breaking/entering-with-intent conviction, leaving other issues for this Court to decide.
On remand this Court addressed (1) ineffective assistance for failure to object to evidence of the separate break-in, and (2) whether a fatal variance existed because the State did not prove both named owners’ property interests.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Campbell's Argument	Held
1. Was trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to admission of evidence (and questioning) about defendant’s separate breaking/entering the same night?	Evidence of the separate break-in was admissible under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 to show intent/plan and impeach defendant’s sanctuary claim; any limiting instruction sufficed to cure prejudice.	Counsel was ineffective for failing to move in limine, redact the interview, or object to cross-examination; admission was unfairly prejudicial evidence of other crimes.	Denied. Counsel not ineffective because the evidence was admissible (temporal proximity and probative value on intent); a limiting instruction would have helped but its absence did not show prejudice.
2. Did a fatal variance exist between the indictment (naming Andy Stevens and Manna Baptist Church as owners) and the evidence at trial?	The church was an entity capable of owning property; the State had to prove ownership interest in the named owners but did show church ownership.	Fatal variance: State never proved Stevens had title or a special property interest; alleging both owners requires proof as to both under Hill and related precedent.	Granted (fatal variance). The evidence established ownership by Manna Baptist Church only; Stevens had no special property interest as an employee, so alleging both owners created a fatal variance in the larceny charge.
3. Should the larceny conviction stand given the fatal variance?	N/A (addressed as consequence of issue 2).	N/A	Larceny conviction vacated due to fatal variance; breaking/entering-with-intent conviction upheld.
4. Remedy (sentencing) after vacatur of larceny conviction?	N/A	N/A	Vacated larceny conviction and remanded for resentencing because convictions were consolidated for judgment.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Campbell, 772 S.E.2d 440 (N.C. 2015) (N.C. Supreme Court held indictment facially sufficient re: church as an entity and sufficient evidence supported breaking/entering-with-intent; remanded remaining issues)
State v. Greene, 223 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 1976) (indictment must allege person with title or special property interest; proof must correspond to owners alleged)
State v. Hill, 79 N.C. 656 (N.C. 1878) (fatal variance where indictment listed multiple owners but proof showed sole ownership)
State v. Beckelheimer, 726 S.E.2d 156 (N.C. 2012) (Rule 404(b) admissibility constrained by similarity and temporal proximity)