State v. Camirand, 463 P.3d 46

Defendant Scott Camirand was tried and convicted of coercion and third-degree robbery based on an alleged assault in which the victim (CM) lost a cell phone, three one-dollar bills, and suffered facial injuries.
Officers arrested defendant wearing athletic-style gloves that an officer testified "appeared" to have dry blood; the gloves were admitted into evidence but the substance was never lab-tested for blood/DNA.
Defense emphasized lack of forensic testing, mismatches in witness descriptions (glove color, defendant’s facial hair), and one eyewitness’s difficulty identifying defendant in court.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to defense argument by telling jurors the jury could view the gloves and stating (improperly) that DNA testing took four to six months and could not have been done in the two months before trial, mentioning the arresting officer’s wedding/honeymoon.
The trial court overruled defense objection to the prosecutor’s timeline comment; the court also refused to give the statutory "witness-false-in-part" (ORS 10.095(3)) instruction. Defendant appealed.
The court of appeals concluded the prosecutor’s comments about why DNA testing had not occurred were improper but harmless, and that refusal to give the witness-false-in-part instruction (even if erroneous) was also harmless; the conviction was affirmed. Justice James dissented, arguing the rebuttal misconduct was not harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor may argue facts not in evidence about why gloves were not DNA-tested during rebuttal	State: Rebuttal may respond to defense suggestion that lack of testing undermines proof; prosecutor could say jurors can infer the stains are blood from the exhibits and testimony	Camirand: Prosecutor improperly argued non‑evidentiary facts (lab delay, officer’s honeymoon) to excuse the absence of forensic testing, prejudicing the jury	Court: Statements that jurors could view the gloves and infer they were blood were permissible rebuttal; however, the prosecutor’s invented factual explanation for lack of testing was error but harmless (little likelihood it affected verdict)
Whether trial court erred in refusing the statutory "witness-false-in-part" instruction	State: Instruction not required unless evidence supports an inference of conscious falsity; instruction adds little and risks implying court's view	Camirand: Inconsistent witness statements and identification problems supported the instruction	Court: Even if the instruction was warranted, failure to give it was harmless—defense extensively attacked witness credibility in closing and the instruction adds little beyond what jurors already may consider

State v. Spieler, 269 Or App 623 (2015) (prosecutor may respond to defense argument about nonadmitted evidence when it fairly rebuts invited inference)
Cler v. Providence Health Sys.-Oregon, 349 Or 481 (2010) (jury should not be exposed to inadmissible evidence or statements suggesting such evidence)
State v. Davis, 336 Or 19 (2003) (Oregon harmless-error standard: affirm if there is little likelihood the error affected the verdict)
Ireland v. Mitchell, 226 Or 286 (1961) (standard for "witness-false-in-part" instruction: requires evidence permitting inference of conscious falsity)
State v. Payne, 298 Or App 438 (2019) (the witness-false-in-part instruction adds little beyond jurors’ ordinary ability to assess credibility)
State v. Ashkins, 357 Or 642 (2015) (harmless-error framework applied to instructional error)