State v. Calabaza, 149 N.M. 612

Defendant Kyle Calabaza was convicted of battery against a household member in metropolitan court on December 3, 2004, and sentenced to 364 days with 55 days already served.
He appealed the conviction to the district court, which affirmed; Calabaza then appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, which affirmed in 2006 and remanded the case.
After the mandate issued (June 27, 2006), the metropolitan court delayed enforcing the sentence, due in part to a mistaken understanding of whether Calabaza remained in custody during appeals.
The Metropolitan Detention Center informed the court in March 2007 that Calabaza had not been in custody; a bench warrant was issued July 9, 2007, and later quashed after briefing on enforcement authority.
In September 2007 the court ruled there was no prejudice from the delay and, ultimately, Calabaza was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence, in community custody.
Calabaza appealed the metropolitan court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, challenging jurisdiction, speedy sentencing, and due process; the district court rejected these arguments and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the delay in enforcing the sentence cause loss of jurisdiction?	Calabaza claimed the delay exceeded permissible limits and the court lost jurisdiction.	Calabaza contended the delay rendered enforcement unlawful due to jurisdictional lapse.	No jurisdiction loss; delay did not render enforcement unlawful.
Does the right to speedy sentencing apply to post-sentencing delays?	Todisco framework may apply to speedy sentencing post-conviction delays.	Delay following sentencing is different from pre-trial delays and Barker factors are not controlling here.	Speedy sentencing framework not directly applicable; delays after conviction are analyzed differently.
Did the delay violate due process by being inconsistent with fundamental liberty and justice?	Delay could infringe due process under a waiver of jurisdiction theory due to prolonged inaction.	Delay was an administrative oversight, not deliberate, with no gross negligence.	No due process violation under the totality of the circumstances; enforceable.

State v. Montoya, 144 N.M. 458 (2008) (jurisdiction questions reviewed de novo)
United States v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1988) (totality-of-circumstances due process analysis for delayed enforcement)
Mobley v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirmatively wrong standard for due process in delayed incarceration)
Barfield v. Doe, 396 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2005) (waiver of jurisdiction and due process considerations in delay)
Martinez v. U.S., 487 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2007) (totality-of-circumstances due process approach (illustrative))
Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) (extraterritorial delay and waiver of jurisdiction principles)
Levandoski, 603 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. App. 1999) (totality of circumstances; delay factors and societal considerations)