State v. Cabezuela, 150 N.M. 654

Background

Defendant Adriana Cabezuela was convicted of intentional child abuse resulting in death of her eight-month-old daughter, Mariana Barraza, under NMSA 1978, §30-6-1(H).
The State charged abandonment or abuse resulting in death, with an instruction referencing §30-6-1(D) and (H).
Evidence included three police interviews in which Cabezuela admitted harming the child or failing to protect her from Boyfriend, and later statements blaming Boyfriend.
The trial court used Uniform Jury Instructions (UJI 14-602/14-610) to define intentional and negligent child abuse and included the phrase “failure to act.”
The jury found Cabezuela guilty based on Instruction No. 3, which mixed intentional and negligent theories and did not require the child to be under twelve years old.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding the instruction misstated the law and that the failure-to-act theory aligns with negligence; retrial was permitted, and the Confrontation Clause issue regarding the supervising pathologist was addressed only for fundamental error.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the jury instruction properly stated the elements of intentional child abuse resulting in death under twelve.	Cabezuela argued Instruction No. 3 merged intentional and negligent theories.	Cabezuela contended the instruction misstated the legal elements and included improper “failure to act.”	Instruction No. 3 was erroneous for mis-stating elements and combining theories.
Whether the jury could have convicted Cabezuela based on insufficient evidence of intentional abuse.	State contends substantial evidence supports intentional abuse through actions or failure to act.	Cabezuela argues lack of proof she intentionally abused the child.	There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, so retrial was not barred by double jeopardy.
Whether the Confrontation Clause was violated by admitting the supervising pathologist’s testimony about the autopsy.	State asserts supervisor had personal knowledge and the testimony was admissible.	Cabezuela argues Melendez-Diaz requires firsthand autopsy testimony.	Testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause; admission was not error.
Whether prosecutorial misconduct claims were preserved for review.	Cabezuela claims multiple misconduct instances occurred.	Not applicable; claims were not preserved.	Prosecutorial misconduct claims were not preserved; remand for new trial did not address them.
Whether double jeopardy barred retrial after reversal on the jury instruction issue.	Retrial barred if evidence insufficient or double jeopardy applies.	Retrial permitted if substantial evidence supports verdict.	Retrial is not barred; sufficient evidence allowed a new trial.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Leal, 104 N.M. 506 (Ct App. 1986) (distinguishes 'cause' vs. 'permit' in §30-6-1; flexibility in charging)
State v. Adams, 89 N.M. 737 (Ct App. 1976) (negligence in failing to act can support conviction when another abuses a child)
State v. Williams, 100 N.M. 322 (Ct App. 1983) (negligent permitting as basis for conviction when failure to act proximately caused harm)
State v. Lopez, 142 N.M. 138 (NMSC 2007) (negligently permitting child abuse supported by in-room presence and knowledge)
State v. Adonis, 145 N.M. 102 (NMSC 2008) (distinguishes intentional vs. negligent for sentencing severity and intent)
State v. Padilla, 143 N.M. 310 (NMSC 2008) (essential elements determined by statute; age element considerations)
State v. Rojo, 126 N.M. 438 (NMSC 1999) (sufficiency review; defer to jury findings when evidence supports)
Benally v. State, 131 N.M. 258 (NMSC 2001) (reversible error may arise from juror confusion even if instruction seems straightforward)
Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016 (NMSC 2011) (addressed sufficiency of evidence with respect to retrial and double jeopardy)