State v. C.D.D., 2019 Ohio 4754

Appellee C.D.D. has prior convictions: possession of cocaine (fourth-degree felony, 1997), possession of cocaine (fifth-degree felony, 1998), and domestic violence (fourth-degree misdemeanor under R.C. 2919.25, 2000).
C.D.D. applied to have his felony conviction records sealed pursuant to R.C. 2953.32; the trial court granted the sealing.
The State appealed, arguing C.D.D. is not an "eligible offender" under R.C. 2953.31 and thus the trial court lacked authority to order sealing.
R.C. 2953.31(A)(1) defines an "eligible offender" two ways: (a) convicted of one to five felonies (none higher than fourth degree) provided none are offenses of violence or sex offenses; or (b) has not more than one felony conviction.
Domestic violence (R.C. 2919.25) is listed in the Revised Code definition of "offense of violence" (R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)(a)), so the appellate court held C.D.D. is not an eligible offender and reversed the sealing order.

Issue	State's Argument	C.D.D.'s Argument	Held
Whether C.D.D. is an "eligible offender" under R.C. 2953.31	C.D.D. has more than one felony and one of his convictions is an "offense of violence," so he is ineligible	He argued the domestic-violence misdemeanor should not count as an "offense of violence" for purposes of R.C. 2953.31	Held: Not eligible—domestic violence is an "offense of violence" under R.C. 2901.01 and he has multiple felonies, so sealing was improper
Whether R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) redefines or limits "offense of violence" to exclude fourth-degree misdemeanors	Relying on statutory text, the State argued R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) lists offenses that automatically preclude expungement but does not redefine "offense of violence"	C.D.D. contended R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) shows legislative intent to exclude certain misdemeanors from the "offense of violence" label for R.C. 2953.31–.35	Held: R.C. 2953.36(A)(3) does not redefine the term; it provides additional automatic exclusions but does not negate R.C. 2901.01's definition
Whether the trial court may disregard plain statutory language as "absurd"	State argued courts must apply the statute as written and cannot rewrite legislative choices	C.D.D. urged the statute produced an absurd result and the court should read it to avoid that result	Held: Court must apply unambiguous statutory text; anti-absurdity canon does not permit substantive re-writing of legislative policy

Erb v. Erb, 91 Ohio St.3d 503 (2001) (courts must give effect to the words used in a statute)
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50 (1988) (rules of statutory construction)
State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223 (2015) (if statute is unambiguous, apply as written)
State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543 (1996) (same: apply clear statutory meaning)
Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2005) (anti-absurdity canon is linguistic, not a license to rewrite statutes)