State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831

Background

On Jan. 9, 2013 a masked gunman entered an apartment where several men were present; multiple shots were fired, Matthew Gibson died and Leland Pruneda was wounded.
Police investigation led to witnesses implicating Marcus G. Butler; Butler was charged with first‑degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.
Key witnesses included Tyler Jewell (accomplice who pleaded guilty to second‑degree murder in exchange for testimony), coworkers who testified Butler confessed or solicited help, and others who placed Butler at or near the scene and who described planning/phone calls.
A three‑day jury trial resulted in convictions on all counts; Butler moved for new trial and for ineffective assistance of counsel; the district court denied relief and sentenced Butler to life with parole eligibility after 20 years and imposed lifetime postrelease supervision.
On direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court Butler raised multiple claims: (1) whether conspiracy instruction presented alternative means/sufficiency problems; (2) whether the jury should have been instructed the conspiracy required an "intentional" rather than "knowing" mens rea; (3) ineffective assistance/new trial grounds; (4) failure to give limiting instructions for K.S.A. 60‑455 evidence; (5) prosecutorial misconduct in closing; and (6) sentencing error regarding parole vs postrelease supervision.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Butler)	Held
Whether K.S.A. 21‑5302 creates "alternative means" for overt acts (jury unanimity/super‑sufficiency)	Not an alternative‑means statute; overt act is a single sequence and jury need not be unanimous as to separate means	Instruction listed alternative overt acts ("discussing and planning," "arrived," "carried out") creating alternative‑means problem and requiring super‑sufficiency	Statute does not list alternative means; the instruction alleged a connected sequence (not alternatives); super‑sufficiency/unanimity inapplicable; sufficiency upheld
Proper mens rea for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery ("knowingly" v. "intentionally")	Where underlying offense (aggravated robbery) requires "knowingly," conspiracy instruction may be given as "knowingly" under K.S.A. 21‑5202(e)	Conspiracy is a specific intent crime requiring "intentionally" (higher culpability)	Court applied mens rea statute in pari materia with robbery statute and upheld the "knowingly" instruction as legally appropriate
Ineffective assistance / new trial claims (failure to investigate DNA, phone records, pawnshop gun, and not calling alibi witness)	Trial counsel made reasonable strategic decisions; many of the facts proffered (alibi affidavit, pawnshop gun) arose after trial or lacked relevance	Counsel failed to pursue obvious, potentially exculpatory leads and failed to call alibi witness, prejudicing the defense	District court’s factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence; no abuse of discretion in denying new trial
Failure to give K.S.A. 60‑455 limiting instruction for prior acts, threats, and drug‑purchase evidence	Prior statements and threats were admissible as res gestae or relevant to intent; limiting instruction required when 60‑455 evidence admitted but omission must be clearly erroneous to reverse	Admission without a limiting instruction allowed jurors to infer propensity; reversal required	Court held threats/solicitations were res gestae (no 60‑455); admission of prior marijuana purchases was 60‑455 evidence and admitting it without a limiting instruction was error but not clearly erroneous given pervasive evidence; no reversal
Prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal: calling defense theory "ridiculous"	Characterizing defense as "ridiculous" was fair comment on the evidence and similar language was used by defense	Word was improper personal denigration of defense and impermissible commentary on credibility	Use of "ridiculous" here was permissible fair comment on believability; not reversible error
Sentencing: lifetime postrelease supervision v. lifetime parole for felony murder	State: felony murder sentence requires life and parole eligibility; lifetime parole (not postrelease supervision) is the proper statutory remedy	Butler: court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision rather than lifetime parole	Parties agreed and Court held district court erred; vacated the postrelease‑supervision portion and remanded for imposition of lifetime parole

Key Cases Cited

State v. Sasser, 305 Kan. 1231 (statutory interpretation of alternative means)
State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181 (alternative means / super‑sufficiency framework)
State v. Foster, 298 Kan. 348 (definition of alternative means)
State v. Enriquez, 46 Kan. App. 2d 765 (Court of Appeals discussion of overt‑act alternatives)
State v. Campbell, 217 Kan. 756 (conspiracy as specific intent historically)
State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494 (K.S.A. 60‑455 admission and limiting instruction requirement)
State v. Douglas, 274 Kan. 96 (prosecutor characterization of defense in closing)
State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88 (modern two‑step prosecutorial‑error analysis)
State v. Potts, 304 Kan. 687 (remedy where court imposed postrelease supervision instead of parole)