State v. Burns
159 Wash. App. 74
Wash. Ct. App.2010Background
- Burns pled Alford to charges of theft and forgery and was sentenced May 16, 2008, with restitution for charged crimes set at $8,983.25.
- At sentencing, the court ordered additional restitution for uncharged crimes to be determined later; prosecutor indicated a hearing would be scheduled within 180 days as required by RCW 9.94A.753(1).
- The State filed a hearing notice in November 2008 and sought a December 2008 hearing, which was delayed to April 14, 2009 while Burns obtained counsel.
- Burns objected on April 14, 2009 that the hearing was beyond the 180-day deadline; the State treated the hearing as a modification of restitution, which Burns disputed.
- The May–June 2009 restitution hearing resulted in an order for an additional $73,237.40 to All-Tech and $20,000 to Zurich Insurance, later challenged by Burns.
- The court later remanded to vacate the June 4, 2009 order; the State conceded Zurich restitution issue was unsupported by evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 180-day deadline applies to determining uncharged restitution | Burns argues the amount for uncharged crimes was not determined within 180 days. | Burns contends the State cannot extend restitution beyond the 180-day period for uncharged crimes. | Yes; the 180-day limit applies to initial determination of restitution for uncharged crimes. |
| Whether the court could modify restitution after 180 days | Burns maintains no lawful basis to add uncharged-restitution beyond 180 days. | State claims RCW 9.94A.753(4) allows modification during jurisdiction. | No; modification beyond 180 days proper only if restitution was determined within 180 days. |
| Whether the Zurich restitution amount was supported by evidence | Burns challenges the $20,000 Zurich restitution as unsupported. | State contends the amount is supported by evidence of damages. | Unsupported; Zurich amount not supported by evidence. |
| Gonzalez applicability to ongoing medical expenses | Gonzalez would permit post-180-day amendments for ongoing expenses in certain contexts. | Gonzalez does not apply where ongoing damages were determinable within 180 days. | Gonzalez does not apply; case at hand is distinguishable. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917 (1991) (restitution power is statutory, not inherent)
- State v. Murray, 118 Wn. App. 518 (2003) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- State v. Hunsicker, 129 Wn.2d 554 (1996) (determination of restitution amount by preponderance)
- State v. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960 (2008) (evidence standard for restitution sufficiency)
- Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256 (2010) (modification of ongoing expenses; not controlling here)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (federal standard referenced in legislative context)