832 S.E.2d 575
S.C.2019Background
- Defendant Shane Burdette shot and killed Evan Tyner; victim died from a single shotgun pellet wound to the back of the neck.
- State charged murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime; defendant maintained the shooting was accidental and gave inconsistent statements to police.
- At trial the court instructed the jury on murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and accident; over defense objection the court told jurors that malice may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.
- The court twice repeated the instructions (including the inferred-malice language) and twice omitted a specific statement that malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter (it did state that malice is not an element of involuntary manslaughter).
- The jury acquitted on murder but convicted Burdette of voluntary manslaughter and weapon possession; the court of appeals agreed the inferred-malice instruction was erroneous but held the error was harmless.
- The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari, held the inferred-malice instruction was reversible error (not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), reversed and remanded for a new trial on the manslaughter and weapon counts, and abolished the court-originated instruction that malice may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Burdette) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction that malice may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon was erroneous | Instruction appropriate; inference may assist proving malice | Instruction was improper because evidence was presented that could reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the killing | Court: Instruction was erroneous under existing precedent when mitigating/excusing evidence exists (and conceded error here) |
| Whether the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Error harmless because defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter (which does not require malice) | The charge as a whole was confusing and permitted the jury to use the inferred-malice instruction to convict of voluntary manslaughter | Court: Error was not harmless; instruction likely contributed to manslaughter verdict; reversal required |
| Whether the inferred-malice instruction remains valid in any case | Permissive inference permissible in some circumstances | Utterly improper; court commentary on facts elevates certain evidence and risks biasing jury | Court: Abolished the court-originated inferred-malice instruction in all cases; parties may argue inference in argument, but courts shall not instruct jury that malice may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon |
| Remedy and retrial scope | New trial on all charges | Defendant cannot be retried for murder (acquitted) | Court: Reversed and remanded for new trial on voluntary manslaughter and weapon possession; double jeopardy bars retrial for murder |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597 (2009) (held inferred-malice instruction improper where evidence could reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify homicide)
- State v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252 (2013) (reaffirmed that the inferred-malice charge is not good law when mitigating/excusing evidence is presented)
- State v. Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322 (2013) (explained courts should not give jury examples or commentaries that single out particular evidence or improperly guide inferences)
- State v. Middleton, 407 S.C. 312 (2014) (articulated harmless-error standard for jury-charge errors)
- State v. Cartwright, 425 S.C. 81 (2018) (noted limits on jury argument and reiterated that parties, not the court, should argue the inferences to be drawn from facts)