State v. Bunyard, 410 P.3d 902

Josiah R. Bunyard was charged with battery, aggravated battery, attempted violation of a protective order, and witness intimidation; trial proceeded after the State located the primary victim only to use her preliminary hearing transcript.
Bunyard filed multiple pro se motions during the prosecution while represented by appointed counsel.
At a pretrial motions hearing the Friday before trial Bunyard interrupted, told the judge he would represent himself, and later stated "unequivocally" that he wished to proceed pro se.
The judge refused to address the oral request, instructed Bunyard to file a written motion (practically impossible over the weekend), and then proceeded to rule on the pending motions without further Faretta-style colloquy.
Bunyard did not reassert the self-representation request at the Monday trial start and the court allowed appointed counsel to withdraw written pro se motions and present oral motions.
Jury convicted Bunyard on all counts; the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kansas Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding the court’s handling of the invocation of the right to self-representation was structural error requiring reversal and remand.

Issue	State's Argument	Bunyard's Argument	Held
Whether Bunyard invoked his right to self-representation pretrial	Invocation was not properly pursued (no written motion, no reassertion), so right was waived	Bunyard clearly and unequivocally asserted the right pretrial and was denied a Faretta colloquy	Court: Invocation was clear; judge improperly refused to address it and imposed a writing requirement that effectively denied the right
Whether Bunyard waived the right by allowing counsel to continue	Allowing counsel to proceed and failing to reassert on trial morning constituted waiver	Failure to reassert was reasonable given the judge’s statement that request would not be addressed unless in writing; silence did not equal waiver	Court: Silence after an effectively thwarted request did not constitute waiver; prior clear assertion must be honored
Whether the trial court’s conduct required a Faretta-standard advisement	Court reasonably required a formal written motion before advising or accepting waiver	The court was required to advise on dangers and obtain a knowing, intelligent waiver once the right was invoked orally	Court: Judge should have conducted Faretta colloquy; failure was error
Nature of the error and remedy	Any error was harmless because Bunyard did not reassert and was represented at trial	Denial of right to self-representation is structural and not subject to harmless-error analysis	Court: Error was structural; convictions reversed and case remanded for further proceedings

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (constitutional right to self-representation)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (denial of proper self-representation cannot be subjected to harmless-error review)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (competence standard for waiving counsel cannot be raised by purely technical legal ignorance)
State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782 (pretrial unequivocal assertion of pro se right requires court inquiry; refusal mandates reversal)
State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373 (scope of Faretta rights and appellate review standard)
State v. Lowe, 18 Kan. App. 2d 72 (court must avoid statements that create impression request will be denied and must elicit knowing, intelligent waiver)