2021 Ohio 4435
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- In 2002 a jury convicted Michael Buehner of two counts of murder (and one attempted murder conviction later reversed) for the 2001 shooting death of Jerry Saunders based primarily on eyewitness testimony from Lawone Edwards and co-defendant Randy Price. No physical/forensic link to Buehner existed.
- During the original investigation police prepared witness statements from Debbie Anderson, Gail Jenkins, Tierra Edwards, and Wilhelmina Mason that described the occupants of the black pickup differently (e.g., Anderson and Jenkins described black occupants and a black shooter; Mason’s statement implicated a different truck/individual).
- At trial the prosecution’s discovery response stated no exculpatory material was in the prosecutor’s possession; defense counsel requested specific witness statements but asserted they were not given the exculpatory reports and did not know of Mason.
- Years later a public-records request produced the undisclosed police reports. On direct appeal this court (Buehner II) held Anderson’s and Jenkins’s reports were exculpatory and that Buehner was unavoidably prevented from discovering them, and remanded for a hearing on materiality.
- On remand the trial court held an expanded Brady hearing, then denied a new trial. The appellate court now reviews that denial, finds the statements of Anderson, Jenkins, and Mason were favorable, were not disclosed, and were material; it reverses in part and remands for a new trial. The court rejects Buehner’s Napue claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Buehner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the undisclosed witness statements (Anderson, Jenkins, Mason) were Brady material and were withheld | The state says it disclosed witness identities and followed its discovery practice of reading reports in closed discovery; the statements were not material and some were cumulative or inconsistent | The statements were favorable (exculpatory/impeaching), were not produced despite specific requests, and would have undermined ID and credibility of key witnesses | Court: The statements were favorable, were not disclosed to defense, and their nondisclosure violated Brady; trial court erred in denying new trial on that basis |
| Whether the suppressed evidence was material (reasonable probability of different result) | The state contends Price’s and Edwards’ trial testimony and other eyewitnesses provided overwhelming proof; inconsistencies do not create reasonable probability of different outcome | Buehner argues the statements directly attack identity and location of shooter and, cumulatively, would have undermined confidence in verdict | Court: Material — cumulative effect undermines confidence in outcome; reasonable probability the verdict would differ; remand for new trial |
| Whether the trial court exceeded scope of appellate remand by expanding hearing to additional exculpatory evidence | State argues inquiry into investigators’ and prosecutors’ practices was proper and relevant | Buehner contends trial court exceeded mandate and reversed prior appellate findings | Court: Trial court did not err in allowing expanded inquiry; scope expansion was justified to resolve materiality and disclosure issues |
| Napue claim alleging state used false testimony (Edwards) | State: No proof Edwards’ testimony was perjured or that prosecutors knew it was false; cross-examination addressed credibility | Buehner: Edwards’ admissions about selling drugs while on probation show falsehoods and suggest Napue violation | Held: Napue claim rejected — no evidence Edwards’ testimony was actually perjured or that prosecution knew of perjury |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (establishes prosecutor’s duty to disclose materially favorable evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (false testimony/impeachment evidence materiality standard)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (prosecutor’s use of known false testimony violates due process)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (materiality includes cumulative effect; duty to learn of favorable evidence held by police)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (definition of materiality: reasonable probability of different result)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady elements articulated)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (Brady/Giglio interplay; prejudice standard)
- State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48 (Ohio discussion of discovery and Brady obligations)