State v. Buckney, 2020 Ohio 4927

In 2005 Todd W. Buckney was convicted of multiple felonies (aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, kidnapping/abduction, disrupting public service) and originally sentenced to 40½ years. Abduction counts were merged into kidnapping at sentencing.
On direct appeal the court reversed and remanded for resentencing under State v. Foster, concluding Buckney’s original sentence was contrary to law. (Buckney I, 2006.)
Resentencing did not occur until September 27, 2019 — a 13‑year delay after the 2006 remand; Buckney initiated a mandamus action in 2019 to prompt resentencing.
At resentencing the trial court merged the abduction counts into kidnapping, imposed individual terms (ranging from 18 months to 7 years on counts), ordered most serious counts consecutive, added 1 year for post‑release control violation, and imposed an aggregate 26‑year sentence.
Buckney appealed, raising: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing; (2) violation of speedy‑trial/right to speedy resentencing (Barker factors) because of the 13‑year delay; (3) erroneous failure to merge allied offenses; and (4) that the sentence was excessive/not reflective of rehabilitation.
The appellate court affirmed: it treated the delay as an inexcusable administrative lapse but found no prejudice (Buckney was incarcerated throughout), concluded counsel’s performance was not deficient, and held the merger claim barred by res judicata.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Buckney)	Held
Speedy resentencing / 13‑year delay	Delay was an administrative lapse but caused no constitutional prejudice because Buckney remained incarcerated and would not have been released	Delay violated Barker factors; prejudiced Buckney	Delay was inexcusable but not prejudicial; no relief granted
Ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing	Counsel actively and adequately advocated (argued Barker factors, merger, disproportionality, institutional record)	Counsel failed to advocate "vigorously" and did not present sufficient mitigation evidence of rehabilitation	Counsel's performance not deficient; no Strickland prejudice shown; claim denied
Merger of allied offenses	Merger issues could and should have been raised on direct appeal and are therefore barred by res judicata	Trial court failed to properly merge offenses at resentencing	Merger claim barred by res judicata; not considered on the limited resentencing
Sentence severity / consideration of rehabilitation	Resentencing was within court's discretion and the judge considered relevant arguments	Sentence remained excessive and trial court should have given more weight to rehabilitation	No reversible error on resentencing; aggregate 26‑year sentence affirmed

State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 (2006) (remedial rule invalidating certain statutory sentencing provisions and requiring resentencing)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor test for speedy‑trial claims; courts apply analogous factors to resentencing delays)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989) (Ohio adoption of Strickland standard)
State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55 (2016) (limited resentencing court not required by Eighth Amendment to accept new mitigation evidence)
State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274 (2006) (overview of Ohio speedy‑trial guarantees and related statutes)