State v. Buckman, 409 P.3d 193

Background

Buckman, age 17 at the time of the offense, pleaded guilty to second-degree rape of a child based on a plea that included a SSOSA (special sex offender sentencing alternative).
At plea and sentencing the court, prosecutor, and defense told Buckman he faced the possibility of life imprisonment and lifetime community custody.
The sentencing statute cited (RCW 9.94A.507) excludes persons who were "seventeen years of age or younger" at the time of the offense; Buckman was 17, so the applicable statutory maximum was 86–114 months and up to 3 years community custody, not life.
After violating SSOSA conditions, Buckman was resentenced; his new counsel discovered the statutory inapplicability and Buckman moved (post-judgment) to withdraw his plea as involuntary due to misinformation.
The trial court denied relief based on a statutory-interpretation view; the Court of Appeals reversed on sentencing error but found no involuntary plea prejudice and remanded for resentencing.
The Washington Supreme Court held (1) Buckman was misinformed and his plea was involuntary, but (2) on collateral review he failed to prove the required "actual and substantial prejudice" (i.e., more likely than not he would have gone to trial), so his motion to withdraw the plea was denied; case remanded for resentencing only.

Issues

Issue	Buckman (Plaintiff) Argument	State (Defendant) Argument	Held
Whether Buckman’s guilty plea was involuntary because he was misinformed of sentencing consequences	Misadvice that he faced life and lifetime community custody rendered plea involuntary	The court and plea form accurately conveyed the correct sentencing range and maximum for the crime charged	Plea was involuntary — Buckman was misinformed (life and lifetime custody were not applicable to his age)
Whether Buckman proved actual and substantial prejudice on collateral attack (i.e., would more likely than not have refused plea and gone to trial)	He swore he would not have pleaded guilty if correctly informed and therefore was prejudiced	The record lacks objective support; overwhelming evidence of guilt and favorable plea make it unlikely a rational person would have risked trial; collateral standard requires proof of prejudice	No; Buckman failed to prove by a preponderance that outcome would more likely than not have been different; collateral relief denied
Proper standard for prejudice on collateral review of involuntary plea claims	Reasonable-probability standard (subjective inquiry) or at least evidentiary hearing on credibility	Washington collateral-review precedent requires actual and substantial prejudice (more likely than not) assessed objectively	Court applies the state-law rule: petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice (would more likely than not have gone to trial) using an objective, rational-person inquiry
Remedy available after finding involuntary plea but no collateral prejudice	Withdraw plea and allow trial	Remand only for resentencing/correction of sentencing error	Court finds constitutional error but denies plea withdrawal; orders resentencing only

Key Cases Cited

In re Personal Restraint of Stockwell, 179 Wn.2d 588 (Wash. 2014) (collateral attack requires showing error plus actual and substantial prejudice)
In re Pers. Restraint of Riley, 122 Wn.2d 772 (Wash. 1993) (adopted reasonable-probability standard for prejudice in ineffective-assistance contexts)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (prejudice standard for plea-related ineffective-assistance claims: reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial)
Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (U.S. 2017) (objective/rational-person inquiry into whether rejecting plea would have been rational)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (U.S. 2012) (relief available where prejudice under federal standard shown, even if state standard is different)
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1971) (prosecutorial promises in plea bargains and related due process concerns)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance test and prejudice concept)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (U.S. 2012) (counsel's duties in plea negotiations and prejudice analysis)