State v. Bryant, 15 A.3d 865

Pierce Bryant pled guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) as part of a plea agreement after charges including aggravated sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual contact were reduced.
Victim was a female relative born in 1993, age under sixteen at the time of the alleged conduct (November 2007–April 2008), with Bryant aged about twenty at plea.
Bryant’s factual basis at plea covered only that he engaged in sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen; he was not asked or required to admit that the conduct would impair or debauch the morals of the child.
The trial court found a sufficient factual basis at the plea colloquy, stating Bryant testified to the necessary elements of the offense.
Bryant later argued on appeal that the factual basis was legally insufficient because it did not prove he knew the conduct would impair or debauch the child’s morals, i.e., lacked the mens rea for the second element.
The appellate panel held that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) does not require proof of knowledge that the conduct would impair morals; instead, it requires knowledge that the defendant engaged in sexual conduct with a child under sixteen and that such conduct had the capacity to impair or debauch the morals of the child, even if the defendant did not know it would have that effect.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 2C:24-4(a) requires knowledge of moral impairment	Bryant argued the State must prove knowledge that conduct would impair morals.	State argued knowledge of the impairment result is not required; only that conduct was sexual with a child and had the capacity to impair morals.	No knowledge of impairment required; capacity to impair suffices.
Whether the gap-filler ‘knowingly’ applies to all elements of 2C:24-4(a)	Bryant contends ‘knowingly’ must attach to all elements.	State contends ‘knowingly’ may apply to some elements, not necessarily all.	Knowingly applies to the first element; second element may be satisfied without a knowing-of-impairment mental state.
Is 2C:24-4(a) a strict liability offense or does it require mens rea for the second element?	Bryant relies on Model Jury Charge requiring knowledge that conduct would impair morals.	State argues no strict liability; the gap-filler helps supply mens rea and no need to prove awareness of impairment.	Not a strict liability offense; second element need not prove awareness of impairment.
What is the proper statutory interpretation and legislative history guiding 2C:24-4(a)?	Bryant urges a more stringent interpretation requiring awareness of impairment.	State contends the statute and history show broader protection; focus on community standards and likelihood of impairment.	Legislative history supports broader construction; conviction affirmed.

State v. Hackett, 166 N.J. 66, 764 A.2d 421 (2001) (endangering statute requires capacity to impair morals, not actual impairment)
State v. Speth, 323 N.J. Super. 67, 731 A.2d 1232 (App.Div. 1999) (crime complete upon act; knowledge of result not required)
State v. Overton, 357 N.J. Super. 387, 815 A.2d 517 (App.Div. 2003) (endangering requires knowing engagement in sexual conduct; intent to impair result not required)
State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (stalking statute interpreted to punish conduct regardless of intent to cause fear; legislative history considered)
State v. Demarest, 252 N.J. Super. 323, 599 A.2d 937 (App.Div. 1991) (addressed strict liability question under gap-filler analysis)
State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597, 10 A.3d 870 (2011) (strict construction and extrinsic sources when construing statute)
State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 989 A.2d 256 (2010) (see above (duplicate entry kept for completeness in citations) )