State v. Bryant, 971 N.W.2d 146

On Sept. 6, 2019, DHHS obtained temporary custody of children previously with appellant John T. Bryant, Sr.; K.B., a DHHS caseworker (7 weeks pregnant), coordinated pickup.
K.B. and Bryant exchanged multiple calls that day; at ~3:45 p.m. Bryant told K.B. a judge and deputy county attorney “deserved a bullet,” and at ~3:53 p.m. told K.B., “take my [expletive] kids, consider yourself next on my list for a bullet.”
K.B. testified she was terrified, vomited, and trembled; call logs corroborated timing of calls. Family service specialists corroborated K.B.’s distressed condition.
Bryant testified he was upset but denied intending to threaten; he claimed dropped calls, that he was continuing the conversation, and that remarks were rhetorical or referring to government/military action—not a personal threat.
After the court denied motions for directed verdict, a jury convicted Bryant of terroristic threats (§ 28-311.01), third-degree assault (§ 28-310(1)(b), enhanced), and intimidation by phone call (§ 28-1310); convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for terroristic threats and third-degree assault	Words and context (calls, prior statements, K.B.’s fear) permitted a jury to find Bryant threatened violence with intent to terrorize or recklessly causing terror	Statements were ambiguous, non‑imminent, mere words, and therefore insufficient to prove a terroristic threat	Affirmed: viewing evidence in prosecution’s favor, jury could infer a threat and requisite intent/recklessness; assault element (menacing) also satisfied
Whether § 28-311.01 requires threatening violence to be imminent or facially unambiguous when based on words only	Statute contains no imminence requirement; threats can be oral and must be assessed in context	Bryant argued words‑only threats need unambiguous, imminent threat to be criminal	Court: statute does not require imminence or a purely literal reading; context and surrounding conduct determine whether words are a threat
Sufficiency for intimidation by phone call when victim initiated earlier call	Returning or placing a telephone call fits statute’s plain meaning; making a threat upon connection supports intent to intimidate	Bryant contended he merely returned a dropped call to continue conversation and lacked intent to intimidate	Affirmed: “telephone” includes returning a call; threat made immediately on connection allowed jury to infer intent to intimidate

State v. Saltzman, 235 Neb. 964, 458 N.W.2d 239 (1990) (upholding convictions based on words-only telephone threats)
State v. Smith, 267 Neb. 917, 678 N.W.2d 733 (2004) (defines intent to terrorize as intent to produce intense fear or anxiety)
State v. Figures, 308 Neb. 801, 957 N.W.2d 161 (2021) (standard of review for sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases)
State v. Duckworth, 29 Neb. App. 27, 950 N.W.2d 650 (2020) (threats may be written, oral, physical, or a combination; context matters)
State v. Frederick, 291 Neb. 243, 864 N.W.2d 681 (2015) (legislative intent expressed by omission as well as inclusion; courts should not add language to statutes)
State v. Canady, 263 Neb. 552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (2002) (reviewing court must accept prosecution evidence and reasonable inferences when assessing sufficiency)
State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488, 919 N.W.2d 133 (2018) (intent as a mental state may be inferred from words, acts, and circumstances)
In re Shaneace L., 130 N.M. 89, 18 P.3d 330 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing plain meaning of “telephone” as a verb to speak to or attempt to reach by telephone)