State v. Bryant, 311 Neb. 206

John T. Bryant, Sr. was convicted by a jury of terroristic threats (Class IIIA felony), third-degree assault (enhanced to Class IIIA felony because victim was pregnant), and intimidation by phone call (Class III misdemeanor) arising from phone calls on Sept. 6, 2019.
A juvenile court issued a temporary custody order placing his children with DHHS; DHHS caseworker K.B. (7 weeks pregnant) was coordinating removal.
Timeline: multiple calls between K.B. and Bryant (around 11:44–11:47 a.m. and again in the afternoon). At ~3:45 p.m. Bryant told K.B. a judge and a deputy county attorney “deserved a bullet.” At ~3:53 p.m. he told K.B., “take my [expletive] kids, consider yourself next on my list for a bullet.”
K.B. testified she was terrified, vomited, and was trembling; call records corroborated call times. Family service staff also observed K.B.’s distressed state.
Bryant admitted making provocative remarks but claimed they were rhetorical, denied intent to terrorize or threaten execution of violence, and asserted calls were continuations after dropped connections.
The district court denied directed‑verdict motions; Bryant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for each conviction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	State's Argument	Bryant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for terroristic threats under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑311.01(1)(a)	Words and surrounding context showed Bryant threatened violence with intent to terrorize or with reckless disregard, supporting conviction.	Words‑only threat was ambiguous, non‑imminent, and too indefinite to satisfy terroristic‑threats elements.	Affirmed. § 28‑311.01 does not require imminence; words‑only threats can suffice when context shows intent or reckless disregard.
Sufficiency for third‑degree assault (threatening in a menacing manner)	Same evidence supports that Bryant’s statements would cause a reasonable person apprehension of bodily harm.	If terroristic‑threat finding fails, assault finding also fails; statements were rhetorical, not menacing.	Affirmed. Jury could infer a menacing threat causing reasonable apprehension.
Sufficiency for intimidation by phone call under § 28‑1310(1)(b)	Telephoning includes returning a dropped call; making the threat immediately after connection supports intent to intimidate.	Call was merely a continuation after K.B. initiated and prior call dropped; intent to intimidate lacking.	Affirmed. “Telephone” covers returned calls; timing and content permitted inference of intent to intimidate.

State v. Figures, 308 Neb. 801, 957 N.W.2d 161 (2021) (standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence)
State v. Smith, 267 Neb. 917, 678 N.W.2d 733 (2004) (intent to terrorize defined as intent to produce intense fear or anxiety)
State v. Saltzman, 235 Neb. 964, 458 N.W.2d 239 (1990) (upholding convictions based on threatening telephone calls; words alone can constitute terroristic threats)
State v. Duckworth, 29 Neb. App. 27, 950 N.W.2d 650 (2020) (threats may be written, oral, physical, or any combination; assess context)
State v. Canady, 263 Neb. 552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (2002) (evidence viewed in light most favorable to prosecution)
State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488, 919 N.W.2d 133 (2018) (intent may be inferred from words, acts, and surrounding circumstances)
State v. Frederick, 291 Neb. 243, 864 N.W.2d 681 (2015) (legislative intent can be shown by omission; courts must apply plain statutory terms)
In re Shaneace L., 130 N.M. 89, 18 P.3d 330 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting “telephone” to include attempts or returned calls for analogous statutes)