State v. Bryant, 311 Neb. 206

John T. Bryant, Sr. was convicted after a jury trial of terroristic threats (Class IIIA felony), assault in the third degree (enhanced to Class IIIA felony because the victim was pregnant), and intimidation by phone call (Class III misdemeanor) arising from events on Sept. 6, 2019.
A juvenile-court order placed temporary custody of his three children with DHHS; K.B., a DHHS caseworker who was 7 weeks pregnant, coordinated the pickup and phoned Bryant several times that day.
Around 3:45 p.m., Bryant told K.B. that a named judge and a deputy county attorney “deserved a bullet.” At 3:53 p.m., he said to K.B., “take my [expletive] kids, consider yourself next on my list for a bullet.” K.B. testified she was terrified, vomited, and was trembling.
Bryant testified he was angry but denied intending to threaten; he claimed calls dropped, that he was continuing prior calls, and that some comments were rhetorical or hyperbolic (referring to government/military intervention).
The district court denied Bryant’s directed-verdict motions; the jury convicted; Bryant appealed only on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for terroristic threats (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.01)	The statements (including “consider yourself next on my list for a bullet”) made in the context of resisting DHHS custody order were sufficient for a jury to find a threat made with intent to terrorize or in reckless disregard of causing terror.	Words-only threat was too ambiguous and non-imminent; insufficient to prove intent to terrorize or a real threat absent violence or history of violence.	Affirmed. Statute does not require imminence; context permits inference of a threat and intent to terrorize or reckless disregard.
Sufficiency for third-degree assault (threatening in a menacing manner, § 28-310)	If terroristic threat is established, assault-by-threat elements (intentional causing of apprehension) are also met.	If terroristic-threat evidence insufficient, then assault-by-threat likewise fails.	Affirmed. Jury reasonably inferred a promise of bodily harm causing apprehension.
Sufficiency for intimidation by phone call (§ 28-1310)	Bryant telephoned K.B. and immediately threatened her; intent to intimidate can be inferred from words and timing.	The call merely continued a conversation initiated by K.B. after a dropped call; intent to intimidate is lacking.	Affirmed. “Telephone” covers calling back; timing and content permit inference of intent to intimidate.

State v. Figures, 308 Neb. 801, 957 N.W.2d 161 (2021) (standard for sufficiency review in criminal cases)
State v. Smith, 267 Neb. 917, 678 N.W.2d 733 (2004) (definition of intent to terrorize)
State v. Saltzman, 235 Neb. 964, 458 N.W.2d 239 (1990) (upholding convictions based on words-only threats)
State v. Frederick, 291 Neb. 243, 864 N.W.2d 681 (2015) (Legislative intent found in statutory text and omissions)
State v. Duckworth, 29 Neb. App. 27, 950 N.W.2d 650 (2020) (threat may be written, oral, physical, or combinations; context matters)
State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488, 919 N.W.2d 133 (2018) (intent may be inferred from words, acts, and surrounding circumstances)