State v. Brunner
2011 Ind. LEXIS 413
| Ind. | 2011Background
- Brunner pleaded guilty in 2000 to OWI as a Class D felony because of prior qualifying OWI offenses.
- Trial court indicated it could sentence as Class A misdemeanor at plea, but later accepted the plea and sentenced accordingly.
- Brunner sought modification of judgment in 2009 from Class D felony to Class A misdemeanor, conditioned on a substance-abuse assessment.
- Court granted modification in October 2009, issuing a 'Modification of Conviction' order without State consent and without timely statutory authority.
- Court of Appeals reversed, holding no statutory authority for later modification; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to resolve jurisdiction and law.
- Supreme Court reversed the modification order and remanded to reinstate Brunner’s original conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the State appeal a trial court's modification of conviction? | State contends modification was unauthorized and appealable as a legal question. | Brunner argues procedural posture is not a basis to bar modification; focus is on merits. | State has limited statutory right to appeal modification under specific conditions; here no such authorization existed. |
| Was the trial court authorized to modify Brunner's conviction from Class D felony to Class A misdemeanor? | State contends modification authority existed under IC 35-50-2-7(b) at the time of judgment. | Brunner asserts court had broad discretion to modify post-conviction for good behavior reforms. | Statutory authority to modify must occur at the moment of conviction prior to sentencing; later modification exceeded statutory grant. |
| What is the proper interpretation of IC 35-50-2-7(b) in this context? | State argues the statute provides an ongoing grant of authority to modify the conviction. | Brunner contends the statute's language supports post-conviction modification if within the mandated window. | Text and context limit modification to the moment of conviction before sentencing; not after. |
| Does IC 35-38-1-1.5 govern modification and apply here? | State maintains no consent or three-year window was satisfied for modification. | Brunner would benefit from post-2003 provisions allowing certain conversions if conditions are met. | Post-2003 provisions do not authorize modification here; no party consent and three-year window expired. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 2009) (limits on improvident sentencing to allow pure-law questions on appeal)
- Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2010) (modification of conviction under plea agreement; statutory framing)
- Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. 2000) (post-conviction relief generally limited to new issues unknown at trial or on direct appeal)
- Henderson v. State, 271 Ind. 633 (Ind. 1979) (purpose of post-conviction remedies; unknown/untested issues)
- McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. 2002) (post-conviction framework; limits on new evidence)
- State v. Huebner, 233 Ind. 566 (Ind. 1954) (state's right to appeal criminal matters is statutory)
- State v. Sierp, 260 Ind. 57 (Ind. 1973) (rigid appellate right for the State; need statutory authorization)
- Abel v. Vigo Circuit Court, 462 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. 1984) (post-judgment control over defendant proceedings)