320 Conn. 740
Conn.2016Background
- Appellate Court reversed portions of Richard Brundage’s convictions and remanded with an order: "new trial as to the remaining charges."
- The state sought to file a substitute information after remand that pleaded entirely different/new crimes than those left by the Appellate Court.
- The trial court accepted the substitute information and proceeded to try the defendant on the newly charged offenses.
- Justice McDonald (dissent) argues this action exceeded the scope of the Appellate Court’s specific remand and conflicted with established remand jurisprudence.
- The dissent emphasizes that a limited remand must be strictly followed and that allowing wholly new charges effectively permits the state a second bite at the apple.
- The dissent warns of institutional harms from permitting parties to reinvent their case on remand and advocates that the state should have filed a new information if it wished to pursue different charges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a limited remand ordering a "new trial as to the remaining charges" permits the state to file a substitute information alleging entirely new offenses | State argued substitute information was permissible and less prejudicial than dismissing and refiling as a new information | Brundage argued the substitute information exceeded the scope of the remand and improperly introduced new charges not before the Appellate Court | Dissent: filing wholly new charges on remand violates the specific remand; the trial court exceeded its authority (Justice McDonald would disallow substitute information) |
| Whether absence of explicit permission in the remand opinion allows new charges on remand | State relied on silence in the opinion and cases allowing broad remands for "further proceedings not inconsistent" | Brundage argued silence is not permission and remand directions control over body text | Dissent: where remand is specific, silence does not authorize deviation; remand terms control |
| Whether the practice of allowing substitute informations undermines finality and limits on pleadings | State claimed practical advantages and less disruption to defendant | Brundage emphasized pleading’s role in framing issues, conserving resources, and preventing piecemeal litigation | Dissent: permitting new charges undermines rule that a case cannot be presented by halves and gives prosecution an unjust second chance |
| Proper procedural step when prosecution wants different charges after reversal | State suggested substitute information is acceptable alternative to refiling | Brundage argued prosecution should file a new information if it wants different charges | Dissent: the correct course is to file a new information; remand must be complied with strictly |
Key Cases Cited
- Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445 (Conn. 1981) (contrast between open-ended remand and specific remand directions)
- Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371 (Conn. 2010) (trial court must strictly comply with remand orders; remand directions control)
- Fair Haven & Westville Railroad Co. v. New Haven, 77 Conn. 667 (Conn. 1905) (plaintiff not allowed to amend pleading where remand order was specific)
- Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124 (Conn. 1993) (lower court exceeded the scope of a limited remand)
- Mazzotta v. Bornstein, 105 Conn. 242 (Conn. 1926) (same principle regarding remand limits)
- Oldani v. Oldani, 154 Conn. App. 766 (Conn. App. 2015) (new claims in amended pleading extraneous to remand for specific purpose)
- Patron v. Konover, 43 Conn. App. 645 (Conn. App. 1996) (lower court exceeded scope of limited remand)
- Grady v. Schmitz, 21 Conn. App. 111 (Conn. App. 1990) (same)
- Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515 (Conn. 1996) (permitting amendment on remand to reflect events occurring after trial distinguished from introducing preexisting new claims)
- Perez v. Cumba, 138 Conn. App. 351 (Conn. App. 2012) (information frames and limits proof at trial)
- Fitch v. State, 139 Conn. 456 (Conn. 1953) (a case cannot be presented by halves)
- Crane v. Eastern Transportation Line, 50 Conn. 341 (Conn. 1882) (parties cannot change pleadings after losing the course they chose)