State v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491

Background

Tony “Black” Irvin was shot to death at a party in April 2012; autopsy showed nine gunshot wounds and multiple fatal wounds; cartridge cases largely matched a single firearm. Gustin Brownlee was identified by several witnesses and arrested; charged with first‑degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm.
Brownlee was jailed pretrial and waived formal arraignment on September 12, 2012; the statutory 90‑day speedy‑trial clock ran from that date.
A September 28, 2012 pretrial conference occurred in Brownlee’s absence; the court assessed time for a continuance against the defense for a period Brownlee later contested, reducing the remaining speedy‑trial days and contributing to a January trial setting.
At trial witnesses generally placed Brownlee at the scene with a gun and described him shooting Irvin multiple times; some witnesses offered inconsistent statements to police.
Trial errors alleged: (1) statutory speedy‑trial violation; (2) failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in closing on premeditation; (4) improper testimony by State witnesses implying prior gun possession and later testing of a gun; (5) cumulative error.
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed convictions, concluding the statutory speedy‑trial violation was rendered non‑reversible by a 2012 amendment, declined voluntary manslaughter instruction, found no reversible prosecutorial misconduct, and held the improper witness statements harmless in context.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Brownlee's Argument	Held
Statutory speedy trial (K.S.A. 22‑3402 90‑day rule)	The court erred to the extent it was asked to consider a parole hold not in the record; post‑2012 amendment (§ (g)) allows delays initially attributed to defendant to be charged to the State without automatic dismissal unless constitutional violation or prosecutorial misconduct	Trial delay between Sept. 28–Oct. 26 was wrongly charged to defense; Brownlee personally objected to continuances and was absent from the Sept. 28 hearing; statutory 90‑day right was violated and requires dismissal	Court: 90‑day limit applied and judge erred in charging that interval to defense; but subsection (g) of 2012 amendment is procedural and retroactive, so statutory violation does not mandate dismissal absent constitutional violation or prosecutorial misconduct; conviction affirmed
Lesser included instruction — voluntary manslaughter	Evidence did not show legally sufficient provocation as a matter of law; no heat of passion/sudden quarrel supporting manslaughter instruction	Evidence of quarrel, insults, physical “rassling,” and escalation outside could support a manslaughter instruction	Court: instruction legally appropriate but not factually warranted on this record (provocation insufficient); no error in refusing instruction
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing (premeditation argument)	Prosecutor’s argument described evidentiary intervals supporting premeditation (wounds, pauses between shots, warning shot, firing after fall) and did not misstate law	Argued prosecutor suggested premeditation could be formed instantaneously or during the act, which is legally improper	Court: prosecutor’s comments stayed within proper bounds given the facts (multiple shots, pause, shots after victim fell); not improper; no reversible misconduct
Mistrial/new trial for improper witness remarks (detective & firearms expert)	Improper references violated trial limits but were fleeting; any admonition might have drawn more attention; overwhelming evidence of guilt made error harmless	Detective’s testimony implied Brownlee had prior gun possession; firearms expert obliquely referenced later testing — both prejudicial and warrant mistrial/new trial	Court: statements violated orders but were brief/unintentional; jury likely already aware from other testimony that Brownlee had a gun; admonition might have been counterproductive; errors harmless under state harmless‑error standard; no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial/new trial
Cumulative error	Combined errors require reversal because they substantially prejudiced Brownlee	Same—cumulative effect of statutory violation and witness/prosecutor errors denied fair trial	Court: only discrete non‑reversible statutory error plus harmless trial errors; cumulative prejudice not established; convictions affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Sievers, 299 Kan. 305 (speedy trial clock starts at arraignment)
State v. Vaughn, 288 Kan. 140 (defense‑requested continuances toll speedy trial; acquiescence requires evidence of agreement)
State v. Montes‑Mata, 292 Kan. 367 (90‑day protection applies only if defendant held solely by reason of charges)
State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313 (statutory construction—plain language governs)
State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620 (factors supporting inference of premeditation)
State v. Hayes, 299 Kan. 861 (voluntary manslaughter as lesser included; provocation standard)
State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927 (multiple blows/stomps can support inference of premeditation)
State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 (misstatement: cannot infer premeditation instantaneously from rapid shots)
State v. Marks, 297 Kan. 131 (limits on prosecutor’s argument about forming premeditation "during the act")
State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941 (premeditation cannot be formed after the homicidal act that caused death)
State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 (standards for lesser‑included instruction review)
State v. Waller, 299 Kan. 707 (mistrial analysis; two‑step test for prejudicial conduct)