State v. Brown, 446 P.3d 568

At 12:48 a.m. dispatch received a named-caller report of a car prowl on SW Alexander St.; caller saw a man “going through things” and described a white male, ~30s, long brown hair, beard, red hat and shorts; caller saw the man walk toward a vehicle that then drove off.
Deputy Waterbury was dispatched and three minutes later (12:51 a.m.) encountered defendant about one block from the reported location; defendant was the only person visible and was smoking beside a parked car.
Waterbury approached with headlights off, asked what defendant was doing, and asked for identification; Waterbury told defendant he matched the caller’s description and was investigating a vehicle break-in.
After being questioned and giving ID, defendant said he had gone into someone’s car; defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful entry into a motor vehicle (ORS 164.272).
The trial court concluded a stop occurred, found the deputy had a subjective belief defendant committed the crime but held that suspicion was not objectively reasonable and suppressed evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the stop was supported by objective reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances and remanded.

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Waterbury had objectively reasonable suspicion to stop defendant under Article I, §9	The report of an in-progress car prowl by a named witness, a detailed physical description, the deputy encountering a single matching person one block away three minutes later at 12:51 a.m., and defendant being the only person in the area gave specific and articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion	Defendant argued the match was insufficient (some descriptive details not recalled), proximity to the scene was not dispositive because the car reportedly drove off, and defendant’s calm demeanor undercuts suspicion	Reversed suppression: the court held the deputy’s suspicion was objectively reasonable given the detailed description, confirmed time/place proximity, lone presence at late hour, and report that criminal activity was occurring

State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or. 163 (Supreme Court) (articulates Article I, §9 stop standard: officer must actually suspect a specific crime and that suspicion must be objectively reasonable)
State v. Blackstone, 289 Or. App. 421 (Court of Appeals 2017) (refused to find reasonable suspicion where only a vague match and other significant mismatches existed, and uncertainty whether a crime occurred)
State v. Nguyen, 176 Or. App. 258 (Court of Appeals 2001) (found reasonable suspicion where an in-progress car prowl was reported by a named caller and officers encountered a vehicle matching time/place and behavior shortly after)
State v. Fuller, 296 Or. App. 425 (Court of Appeals) (discusses standard that articulated facts need only make the officer’s subjective belief logically plausible)