State v. Brown
310 Neb. 224
| Neb. | 2021Background:
- Information charging Joshua J. Brown with first-degree assault filed Oct. 31, 2019; initial jury term set for Feb. 3, 2020.
- State moved to continue the Feb. term (Jan. 29) to secure the victim’s presence; court granted over Brown’s objection and later continued trial sua sponte on March 23 and May 29, 2020 citing COVID-19 public‑health concerns.
- The court’s March and May orders expressly stated the pandemic continuances were for “good cause” and that the delay would be excluded from the 6‑month statutory speedy‑trial computation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(f).
- Brown filed a motion for absolute discharge on speedy‑trial grounds on July 31, 2020, arguing only 26 days were excludable and that the pandemic continuances lacked evidentiary support for “good cause.”
- At an evidentiary hearing the court took judicial notice of public‑health pronouncements and local court orders, found the pandemic continuances were supported (excluding an additional 100 days), and overruled Brown’s motion; Brown appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court’s pandemic continuances were excludable as "good cause" under §29‑1207(4)(f) | Pandemic‑related public‑health facts and court orders justified continuances; State met burden at the discharge hearing | Continuances lacked evidentiary basis; court could not exclude time without contemporaneous evidence | Court: Not clearly erroneous to find good cause; continuances excludable |
| Whether evidence of good cause must be presented when a sua sponte continuance is ordered, or may be presented later at a discharge hearing | Evidence may be presented at the motion for discharge; only requirement is objective existence of the substantial reason at the time of the delay | Argued the court needed evidence at the time of its sua sponte orders | Court: Evidence at the discharge hearing and judicial notice of public orders suffice; good cause need not be articulated contemporaneously |
| Whether Brown’s federal and state constitutional speedy‑trial rights were violated (Barker test) | Delays were for valid reasons (pandemic and defense motions); Brown not prejudiced; Barker factors weigh against a violation | Asserted that the length and court delays violated constitutional rights | Court: Barker balancing favors State; no constitutional speedy‑trial violation |
| Proper computation of the 6‑month statutory period start/end dates | The last day of the 6‑month period is calculated by excluding the filing day, counting 6 months, then backing up one day (so April 30 here) | Court and Brown had used May 1; Brown’s overall calculation still left no other excludable days aside from his motions | Court agreed with State’s calculation (April 30 as base) but still found additional excluded time due to continuances |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616, 961 N.W.2d 539 (2021) (sets out speedy‑trial computation method)
- State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021) (defines "good cause" and requires specific factual findings for §29‑1207(4)(f) exclusions)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (announces four‑factor balancing test for constitutional speedy‑trial claims)
- State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494, 960 N.W.2d 739 (2021) (permits judicial notice of pandemic‑related court orders/guidance in criminal proceedings)
- U.S. v. Olsen, 995 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2021) (observes a global pandemic can justify temporary suspension of jury trials under "ends of justice" reasoning)
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019) (uses statutory speedy‑trial limits as a useful standard in constitutional speedy‑trial analysis)
- State v. Torres, 28 Neb. App. 758, 948 N.W.2d 288 (2020) (contrast on limits of judicial notice where facts are not generally known)