State v. Brown
310 Neb. 224
| Neb. | 2021Background:
- Information charging Joshua J. Brown with first‑degree assault was filed Oct. 31, 2019; initial trial was set for Feb. 2020.
- The State successfully moved (Jan. 29, 2020) to continue to April 6 because the alleged victim had moved out of state; Brown objected.
- The court sua sponte continued the trial on Mar. 23, 2020 to June 8 and again on May 29, 2020 to Aug. 3, 2020, citing public‑health concerns from COVID‑19 and health‑department/CDC guidance.
- Brown withdrew some pretrial motions, filed a motion for absolute discharge on July 31, 2020 asserting statutory (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29‑1207/29‑1208) and constitutional speedy‑trial violations.
- After an evidentiary hearing and judicial notice of public orders and health guidance, the district court excluded 100 pandemic days (plus 26 days for Brown’s motions), found good cause under § 29‑1207(4)(f), overruled discharge, and set trial; Brown appealed.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial claims and affirmed the district court.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Brown) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the court’s pandemic continuances excludable as "good cause" under § 29‑1207(4)(f)? | Continuances lacked evidentiary support; Chief Justice/admin orders kept courts open; no good cause. | Pandemic public‑health declarations, health‑dept guidance, and local conditions provided substantial legal reason; continuances justified. | Affirmed: continuances were for good cause; exclusion proper. |
| Did statutory speedy‑trial time expire such that Brown was entitled to absolute discharge? | Six‑month clock expired (Brown’s math: last day May 26/27); no other excludable time. | Excluding 26 days for motions and pandemic continuances (100 days) extended the statute beyond Brown’s discharge motion date. | Affirmed: statutory period extended; no absolute discharge. |
| Did delays violate Brown’s federal/Nebraska constitutional right to a speedy trial (Barker factors)? | Delay deprived Brown of constitutional speedy trial. | Delays were valid/public‑health, not deliberate; Brown asserted right but prejudice not shown. | Affirmed: balancing (length, reason, assertion, prejudice) does not show constitutional violation. |
| Could the court take judicial notice of pandemic facts and public orders when assessing good cause? | Court improperly relied on its own knowledge; judicial notice not appropriate for some facts. | Court may judicially notice public orders, declarations, and widely known pandemic facts. | Affirmed: judicial notice of public health orders and pandemic facts was proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616 (statutory speedy‑trial computation rule)
- State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 ("good cause" defined as substantial legal excuse; factual, case‑by‑case inquiry)
- State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494 (judicial notice of COVID‑19 orders/guidance permissible)
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (use of statutory speedy‑trial framework to assess constitutional delay)
- State v. Torres, 28 Neb. App. 758 (limits on judicial notice of court’s internal procedures)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (four‑factor balancing test for constitutional speedy trial)
- U.S. v. Olsen, 995 F.3d 683 (pandemic qualifies as unique circumstances permitting temporary suspension of jury trials)