State v. Brown
310 Neb. 224
| Neb. | 2021Background
- Information charging Joshua J. Brown with first-degree assault filed Oct. 31, 2019; trial originally set for Feb. 3, 2020.
- Trial continued to April 6, 2020, on the State’s motion (victim out of state); Brown objected.
- On Mar. 23, 2020, the district court sua sponte continued the trial to June 8 citing COVID-19 public-health concerns and ordered that the delay not count against the State’s six-month speedy-trial clock; Brown objected.
- On May 29, 2020, the court again sua sponte continued the trial to Aug. 3 for COVID-19 reasons.
- Brown filed a motion for absolute discharge on July 31, 2020, arguing statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations; after an evidentiary hearing the district court excluded 26 days for Brown’s motions and 100 days for the pandemic continuances and overruled the motion.
- Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: pandemic-related continuances qualified as "good cause" under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f), the State met its burden at the discharge hearing (including by judicial notice), and Barker balancing did not show a constitutional violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court’s COVID-19 continuances were excludable as "good cause" under §29-1207(4)(f) | Pandemic and public-health directives created substantial legal excuse; continuances warranted and excludable | Continuances lacked evidentiary support when entered; Chief Justice orders showed courts remained open; no good cause | Affirmed: continuances were for good cause; record (including judicial notice) supported findings |
| Who bears burden to prove excluded time and when evidence may be offered | State must prove by preponderance; may present evidence at discharge hearing; court may take judicial notice | State presented no contemporaneous proof at time of sua sponte orders, so exclusions invalid | Affirmed: State met burden at hearing; courts may consider whole record and take judicial notice of public health facts |
| Required specificity of a "good cause" finding under §29-1207(4)(f) | Specific factual findings were made in continuance orders and in ruling on discharge | A generalized "good cause" finding is insufficient | Affirmed: court’s findings were sufficiently specific and supported by the record |
| Whether delays violated constitutional speedy-trial rights (Barker factors) | Delays were for valid public-health reasons; Brown not prejudiced or incarcerated; Barker balance favors State | Brown asserted his right and argued delay was prejudicial and unreasonable | Affirmed: Barker factors do not show constitutional violation under the circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616 (discusses computation of statutory six-month speedy trial period)
- State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (good cause defined as substantial reason affording legal excuse; factual inquiry)
- State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494 (courts may take judicial notice of COVID-19 orders and guidelines)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (establishes four-factor balancing test for constitutional speedy-trial claims)
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (uses statutory speedy-trial limits as guide in constitutional speedy-trial analysis)