State v. Brown
310 Neb. 224
Neb.2021Background
- Information charging Joshua J. Brown with first-degree assault filed Oct. 31, 2019; trial initially set for Feb. 2020 and later continued.
- Jan. 29, 2020: State's continuance (victim relocated) moved trial to Apr. 6 over Brown's objection.
- Mar. 23, 2020: District court sua sponte continued the trial to June 8 citing COVID‑19 public‑health concerns and ordered the period excluded from the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial clock.
- May 29, 2020: Court again sua sponte continued the trial to Aug. 3 for the same pandemic reasons and excluded that period.
- Brown filed a motion for absolute discharge on July 31, 2020, asserting statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial violations; after a hearing the district court excluded 100 pandemic days plus 26 days for Brown’s pretrial motions, overruled the motion, and set the case for the next jury term.
- Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: found pandemic continuances were supported by the record/judicial notice and excludable as good cause, and held Brown’s federal and state constitutional speedy‑trial rights were not violated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were the court's COVID‑19 continuances excludable as 'good cause' under §29‑1207(4)(f)? | Pandemic, public‑health orders, local health data, and evidence at the discharge hearing satisfied the State's burden to show good cause; court could take judicial notice. | Continuances were sua sponte and unsupported by contemporaneous evidence; court's statements alone cannot create statutory good cause. | Affirmed. Court found good cause existed; judicial notice plus hearing evidence supported exclusion of the pandemic delays. |
| Did the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial period expire before Brown's discharge motion? | Proper calculation (exclude filing day, count 6 months, back up 1 day) and added excluded time left time on the clock after accounting for motions and pandemic exclusions. | Only the 26 days attributable to Brown's motions were excludable; no further exclusions applied, so the statutory period expired before July 31. | Affirmed. Court corrected the six‑month endpoint to April 30, then after excluding 26 days and 100 pandemic days the deadline extended past July 31, so discharge was not required. |
| Did the COVID‑19 delays violate Brown's Sixth Amendment and Neb. Const. speedy‑trial rights (Barker factors)? | Delays were for valid public‑health reasons, not a deliberate attempt to hinder defense; Brown was not incarcerated and showed no specific prejudice. | Brown objected early and invoked his right; the delay deprived him of a speedy trial and caused prejudice. | Affirmed. Applying Barker v. Wingo, court balanced the four factors and concluded no constitutional speedy‑trial violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616, 961 N.W.2d 539 (2021) (speedy‑trial time computation rule).
- State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021) (definition and case‑by‑case nature of 'good cause' under §29‑1207(4)(f)).
- State v. Estrada Comacho, 309 Neb. 494, 960 N.W.2d 739 (2021) (judicial notice of COVID‑19 orders and related procedural context).
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Barker balancing test for constitutional speedy‑trial claims).
- State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019) (use of statutory speedy‑trial framework as a benchmark in constitutional analysis).
- United States v. Olsen, 995 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2021) (recognizing global pandemic as contextually significant for suspending jury trials).