454 P.3d 870
Wash.2019Background
- On March 22, 2015 in Kennewick, WA, David Brown made several lane changes and ultimately executed a left turn; he intermittently used his turn signal and did not reactivate it while actually making the left turn.
- A state patrol vehicle followed Brown and initiated a traffic stop; Browns breath test measured 0.26 and he was arrested for DUI.
- Brown moved to suppress evidence from the stop; the district court found a driver need not reactivate a turn signal upon entering a turn-only lane and suppressed the evidence.
- The superior court upheld the district courts factual findings but reversed on whether continuous signaling was required under RCW 46.61.305; the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, holding a signal is required only when public safety is affected.
- The State sought review. The Washington Supreme Court interpreted "when required" in RCW 46.61.305(2) to modify the manner of signaling (continuous for the last 100 feet) and held a signal is required for turns or lane changes on a roadway; because Brown did not continuously signal, he violated RCW 46.61.305.
- The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its holding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "when required" in RCW 46.61.305(2) | The State: signals are required for turns/ lane changes on a roadway; "when required" describes the manner (continuous for last 100 ft). | Brown: "when required" implies signaling is required only when necessary for safety (i.e., when other traffic may be affected). | "When required" modifies the manner of giving a required signal on a roadway; signaling is required for turns/lane changes and must be continuous for the last 100 feet. |
| Whether Brown violated RCW 46.61.305 by not continuously signaling | The State: Brown failed to continuously signal his left turn and thus violated .305. | Brown: being in a turn-only lane (and having signaled to enter it) removed the duty to reactivate and continuously signal while executing the turn. | Brown violated .305 because he did not continuously signal during the final approach/turn; suppression ruling reversed as to this issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516 (Wash. 2010) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; plain language controls).
- Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365 (Wash. 2007) (ambiguity permits resort to legislative history and related statutes).
- Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1 (Wash. 2002) (statutory context and related provisions inform legislative intent).
- State v. Fasteen, 740 N.W.2d 60 (N.D. 2007) (similar signaling statute construed to mean "when required" refers to signaling on a roadway as required by subsection (1)).
- State v. Greever, 183 P.3d 788 (Kan. 2008) (interpreting an identical signaling provision to require continuous signaling for at least 100 feet before a turn).
- Grindeland v. State, 306 Mont. 262 (Mont. 2001) (distinguishable: Montana statute tied signaling explicitly to whether other traffic may be affected).