State v. Brown
114350
| Kan. | May 12, 2017Background
- Michael Brown was convicted in 1999 of first-degree murder and sentenced to life with a hard 40 (no parole for 40 years); conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Brown filed multiple collateral attacks over the years (K.S.A. 60-1507, K.S.A. 22-3504, federal habeas) without success before filing the 2013 K.S.A. 22-3504 motion at issue.
- In 2013 Brown argued his judicially-enhanced hard-40 life sentence is illegal under Alleyne v. United States, which requires any fact increasing a mandatory minimum to be found by a jury.
- The district court denied Brown’s K.S.A. 22-3504 motion, holding Alleyne does not apply retroactively in a K.S.A. 22-3504 proceeding to cases already final when Alleyne was decided.
- Brown contended K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 (amended after Alleyne) mandated retroactive application of Alleyne to his sentence; the court found that statute only governs resentencing after a sentence has been vacated and does not itself vacate sentences.
- The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, explaining Alleyne-based constitutional claims are not proper grounds for relief under K.S.A. 22-3504 and that the statutory retroactivity provisions apply only if a sentence is vacated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alleyne claim can be raised in a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion to correct an illegal sentence | Brown: Alleyne renders his judicially-enhanced hard-40 sentence illegal and K.S.A. 22-3504 permits correction | State: An Alleyne-based constitutional claim is not an "illegal sentence" under K.S.A. 22-3504; Moncla controls | Denied — Alleyne claims are constitutional and not remediable via K.S.A. 22-3504 (Moncla) |
| Whether K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 mandates retroactive application of Alleyne to sentences final before June 17, 2013 | Brown: The statute’s retroactivity language requires application of Alleyne and jury findings on aggravators | State: The statute only governs resentencing after a sentence has been vacated and does not independently vacate sentences | Denied — statute does not provide an independent basis to vacate or retroactively apply Alleyne absent vacatur |
| Whether subsection (e) of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 triggers resentencing when sentence not vacated | Brown: Subsection (e) compels resentencing under the amended statute | State: Subsection (e) applies only if the sentence is vacated for specified reasons | Denied — subsection (e) requires a prior vacatur; Brown’s sentence was not vacated |
| Whether Soto or other precedents required a different outcome for final cases | Brown: Soto and related cases support retroactivity or at least ripeness for his claim | State: Soto applied Alleyne prospectively to nonfinal cases; it did not create statutory retroactivity for final cases | Denied — Soto did not mandate different relief here; Brown’s posture differs (final sentence not vacated) |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts increasing mandatory minimum must be found by a jury)
- State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102 (2014) (applied Alleyne to invalidate Kansas hard‑50 scheme in nonfinal cases)
- State v. Moncla, 301 Kan. 594 (2015) (Alleyne constitutional claims are not cognizable in K.S.A. 22‑3504 motions)
- State v. Brown, 272 Kan. 809 (2001) (direct-appeal decision affirming Brown’s conviction and sentence)