State v. Brown, 111166

Background

Antonio Brown was arrested and interviewed by police after 14‑month‑old Clayden Urbanek suffered fatal injuries; Brown was charged with felony murder, two counts of child abuse, and interference with a law enforcement officer.
Brown signed a Miranda waiver form but asked to call an attorney during the recorded interview; officers assisted him in attempting to contact counsel, who was unreachable.
After failing to reach his lawyer, Brown told officers he would talk, saying he had “nothing to hide”; investigators then questioned him for about six hours (with brief breaks) and obtained incriminating statements.
Brown was convicted on all counts; a jury found multiple aggravating factors and recommended upward durational departures for both child‑abuse counts; the district court imposed doubled sentences.
On appeal Brown argued: (1) his post‑request statements should be suppressed for Miranda violation and involuntariness; (2) the jury should have been instructed on lesser included murder offenses; (3) insufficient evidence supported the interference conviction; and (4) departure sentences lacked substantial and compelling reasons.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Brown)	Held
Whether Brown invoked right to counsel and whether he validly waived it by reinitiating discussion	The interrogation was permissible because Brown reinitiated contact and waived counsel after unsuccessful call attempts	Brown invoked his right to counsel and investigators continued questioning in violation of Miranda	Court: Brown did invoke the right initially but reinitiated questioning after failing to reach counsel and knowingly and intelligently waived the right; statements admissible
Whether Brown’s statements were voluntary	Statements were voluntary under the totality of circumstances (mental state, length, officers’ conduct, language fluency)	Statements were involuntary due to emotional state, lengthy interrogation, and emotionally charged questioning	Court: State proved voluntariness by a preponderance; statements voluntary
Whether officers needed to re‑Mirandize after breaks	No renewed warnings were required given totality of circumstances and time gaps	Miranda warnings should be given after each break as a matter of course	Court: Renewed warnings unnecessary; gaps and breaks did not render later statements invalid
Whether the court erred by refusing lesser‑included instructions on felony murder	Statutory amendments eliminate lesser included offenses of felony murder and apply retroactively	Brown: retroactive application violates Ex Post Facto, due process, and state constitutional jury‑trial rights	Court: Statutory elimination is retroactive and constitutional; no entitlement to jury instruction on non‑statutory lesser offenses
Sufficiency of evidence for interference with law enforcement	Hiding in a basement after officers identified themselves and ordering him out substantially hindered officers and increased their burden	Brown: delay was only a few minutes and did not substantially hinder officers	Court: A rational factfinder could find Brown’s concealment substantially hindered officers; conviction affirmed
Whether upward departure sentences for child abuse were supported	Victim’s extreme youth and other aggravating factors made departure substantial and compelling	Brown: age is an element of child abuse; using age as aggravator is improper and departure unjustified	Court: A 14‑month‑old’s vulnerability (relative to 0–17 statutory range) and excessive brutality supported substantial and compelling reasons; departures affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (Miranda waiver and invocation principles)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (requirement to cease questioning after invocation of right to counsel)
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (test for whether suspect reinitiated dialogue)
State v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939 (2003) (Kansas application of post‑invocation waiver test)
State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263 (2014) (retroactive abolition of lesser included offenses does not violate Ex Post Facto)
Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (no federal due process right to jury instruction on offenses not recognized as lesser included by state law)
State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261 (2007) (distinguishing permissible truth‑telling exhortations from coercion in voluntariness analysis)
State v. Mattox, 280 Kan. 473 (2005) (Miranda renewal unnecessary after reasonable gaps)
State v. Betancourt, 301 Kan. 282 (2015) (State bears burden by preponderance to prove voluntariness)