2016 Ohio 310
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Marques Brown pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter with a gun specification; parties jointly recommended an aggregate 12-year sentence (nine years nonmandatory).
- As part of the plea agreement and the sentencing entry, Brown agreed he would be ineligible for earned days of credit, transitional control, and judicial release (and other reductions).
- The trial court imposed the jointly-recommended sentence and included the agreed restrictions in its judgment entry.
- Brown’s direct appeal failed; his App.R. 26(B) application to reopen was granted on the ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the court’s authority to limit earning-of-credit eligibility under R.C. 2967.193 (per State v. Livingston).
- On reopening, Brown challenged three sentencing conditions: (1) prohibition on earned credits, (2) denial of transitional control, and (3) denial of judicial release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court could bar Brown from earning prison-credit days under R.C. 2967.193 as part of a jointly recommended sentence | The parties agreed to the restriction; thus it should be enforced | R.C. 2967.193 vests discretion in DRC, not the trial court; the court lacks statutory authority to bar earned-credit participation | Vacated the no-earned-credits portion: trial court lacked authority to impose this restriction (sustained for Brown) |
| Whether trial court could preclude transitional control under R.C. 2967.26 as part of sentence | Agreement to bar transitional control is valid; court has statutory authority to disapprove DRC transfers | Trial court must wait for DRC notification; pre-sentencing prohibition thwarts statutory purpose | Overruled Brown’s claim: court may bar transitional control as part of the agreed sentence (restriction authorized) |
| Whether trial court could preclude judicial release under R.C. 2929.20 as part of sentence | Court has statutory power to deny judicial release; parties may agree to bar it | Statute contemplates denial only after a motion; preemptive ineligibility is unauthorized | Overruled Brown’s claim: court may bar judicial release as part of the agreed sentence (restriction authorized) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Livingston, 9 N.E.3d 1117 (Ohio App. 2014) (trial court lacks authority to limit earned-credit participation; such limits in agreed sentences are unauthorized)
- State v. Underwood, 922 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2010) (agreed-upon sentences are reviewable if not authorized by law or if they fail to comport with mandatory sentencing provisions)
- State v. Fischer, 942 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 2010) (judicial sentences must be authorized by statute; judges lack inherent power to create sentences)
- State v. Porterfield, 829 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio 2005) (parties’ agreement on sentence supports appellate deference unless sentence is unauthorized)