State v. Brooks, 208 N.E.3d 751

Background

Ladasia Brooks was indicted for aggravated burglary, burglary, assault, domestic violence, and related offenses for an altercation on June 5, 2018; her jury trial occurred in October 2019.
Between the date of the offense and the trial, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 228 (eff. March 28, 2019), which amended R.C. 2901.05 to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defense when evidence tending to support self-defense is presented.
At trial the court instructed the jury under the pre-amendment version of R.C. 2901.05, placing on Brooks the burden to prove self-defense by a preponderance; Brooks was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate seven-year term.
The Fifth District affirmed, holding the amendment did not apply to conduct that predated H.B. 228; this created a conflict with other districts. The Supreme Court accepted discretionary review and a certified conflict question.
The Ohio Supreme Court held H.B. 228 applies to all trials occurring on or after March 28, 2019, regardless of when the alleged criminal conduct occurred, and that applying the amendment in such cases does not violate Ohio’s Retroactivity Clause or the federal Ex Post Facto Clause.
The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for the Fifth District to decide whether Brooks was actually entitled to assert a self-defense claim (an unresolved factual/legal contention about trespass/privilege).

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Brooks' Argument	Held
Whether H.B. 228 (R.C. 2901.05 as amended) applies to trials after its effective date even when the alleged offense occurred earlier	Applying the amendment to pre-act conduct would be retroactive/ex post facto and unconstitutional	The amended statute governs trials that occur after its effective date; the trial court erred by using the pre-amendment law	H.B. 228 applies to all trials on or after March 28, 2019, regardless of when the offense occurred
Whether applying H.B. 228 violates Ohio’s Retroactivity Clause or the U.S. Ex Post Facto Clause	The burden-shift is substantive and would deprive defendants of a defense available when the offense occurred	The amendment is procedural/remedial in operation, does not create a new crime or increase punishment, and is thus constitutional as applied to trials after the effective date	Application to trials after the effective date does not violate Ohio’s Retroactivity Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause
Whether reallocating the burden of proof here is a substantive change that cannot be applied to past conduct	Reallocation is substantive and changes the legal rules of evidence	The allocation is a procedural rule affecting trials and may be applied prospectively to trials after the effective date; distinguish prior precedents that imposed burdens on defendants	The Court treats this burden shift as procedural/remedial and permits prospective application to trials after the effective date; Jones (where the burden shifted to defendants) is distinguished
Whether Brooks was entitled to claim self-defense given state’s trespass/privilege argument	Brooks could not assert self-defense if she lacked the right to be in the residence	Brooks contends she had permission and therefore could assert self-defense	Court did not resolve this factual/legal issue; remanded to the court of appeals to decide whether Brooks was entitled to the self-defense claim

Key Cases Cited

State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95 (1977) (applied amended R.C. 2901.05 prospectively to all trials on or after the statute’s effective date when burden shifted to the prosecution)
State v. Jones, 67 Ohio St.2d 244 (1981) (held retroactive reallocation of burden to the defendant violated the Ex Post Facto Clause)
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (recited Calder categories of ex post facto prohibitions)
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (original enumeration of the four categories of ex post facto laws)
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (statutes that deprive defendants of defenses available at the time of the offense may violate ex post facto principles)
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100 (1988) (distinction between remedial/procedural and substantive/rights-affecting statutes for retroactivity analysis)
State ex rel. Holdridge v. Industrial Commission, 11 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967) (rules of practice/procedure apply to proceedings conducted after adoption)
Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000) (recognizes that burden of proof allocation can have substantive importance)