State v. Brooks, 319 Neb. 377

Background

Paul Douglas Brooks was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault involving a child, and filed a plea in abatement, which was overruled.
The State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of other sexual assaults under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-414, identifying witnesses Brooks wished to depose prior to the admissibility hearing.
At a status hearing, Brooks requested time to complete depositions of these witnesses before the § 27-414 hearing, requesting this occur by mid-July; the court set the evidentiary hearing for August 19.
Brooks completed depositions between June and August; trial was ultimately set for October 1, 2024.
Brooks moved for absolute discharge, arguing his statutory speedy trial rights had been violated—the State disagreed, asserting time for depositions should be excluded from the speedy trial period.
The district court denied Brooks’ motion, finding the deposition period excludable for good cause, thereby making the trial timely.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the time Brooks requested to take depositions excludable for speedy trial purposes under § 29-1207(4)?	Brooks argued this was not a continuance or period excludable under statute; routine discovery should not add excludable time.	The State argued that Brooks' request for more time to prepare was good cause for delay, and the time should be excluded.	The court held the period from May 23 to mid-July was excludable for good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f).
Did the court err in finding good cause for excluding the period Brooks took depositions?	Brooks said there was insufficient evidence for good cause and prep for standard hearings shouldn't delay trial.	The State pointed to Brooks’ specific request for more time as substantial, justifying exclusion.	The court found specific justification: Brooks’ own request was good cause, supporting exclusion of the period.
Did excluding this time extend the time for bringing Brooks to trial beyond the end of the speedy trial period?	Brooks argued the exclusion was inappropriate and the last trial date should have been September 1.	The State argued, with exclusions, trial was timely as set for October 1.	The court found, with excludable periods, speedy trial time expired Oct. 26; thus October 1 trial was timely.
Did the delay in setting the hearing beyond the 15-day statutory notice period in § 27-414 have legal effect?	Brooks suggested any delay beyond statute was improper and unsupported by evidence.	The State argued the delay was at Brooks’ request, exceeding statutory minimum for his benefit.	Court found the State gave notice timely, and Brooks’ request for more time justified the longer period for good cause.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Rashad, 316 Neb. 101 (defining “good cause” under the speedy trial statutes)
State v. Lear, 316 Neb. 14 (statutory interpretation is a question of law)
State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464 (review of periods excluded from speedy trial period requires specific findings; defines standard of appellate review)
State v. Space, 312 Neb. 456 (explaining meaning of “continuance” in the context of speedy trial exclusions)
State v. Williams, 313 Neb. 981 (specific findings required for “good cause” speedy trial exclusions)
State v. Feldhacker, 267 Neb. 145 (explains “period of delay” for speedy trial exclusions)
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (equates “period of time” and “period of delay” in speedy trial jurisprudence)
State v. Murphy, 255 Neb. 797 (court must find "good cause" to exclude time for depositions under speedy trial rule)