State v. Brock
2019 Ohio 3195
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- On Oct. 30, 2017, Jeramy Lee Brock went to the home of Saraha McNeil, who had an active civil protection order prohibiting Brock from contacting her or coming within 500 feet of her residence; McNeil testified Brock entered after she had partially closed the door.
- McNeil called 911 (left the line open) and police from the Springfield Police Division responded; officers discovered an outstanding warrant for Brock and attempted to arrest him.
- During the arrest Brock resisted, grabbed Officer Freeman’s wrist, kicked, and was tasered multiple times before being handcuffed and transported to a hospital; Officer Freeman treated for a severe wrist sprain.
- A Clark County grand jury charged Brock with burglary (R.C. 2911.12(A)(2)), violating a protection order, obstructing official business, vandalism (later dismissed), and assault (with a peace-officer specification).
- A jury convicted Brock of burglary, violating a protection order, obstructing official business, and assault; the trial court imposed concurrent and consecutive prison terms totaling multi-count consecutive time.
- On appeal Brock raised (1) insufficient evidence as to venue, (2) insufficient evidence of force/stealth/deception for burglary, (3) ineffective assistance via counsel’s alleged conflict from prior representation of the victim, and (4) ineffective assistance for failure to move for acquittal on venue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brock) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue proven | Testimony identified street address; protection-order records and Springfield officers tie offense to Clark County | Venue not proven beyond reasonable doubt; counsel should have moved under Crim.R.29 | Venue established by address, records, and responding Springfield officers; no plain error |
| Burglary element of force | Minimal physical exertion (opening a closed door) qualifies as "force" under R.C. 2911.12 | Entry lacked force/stealth/deception; door not fully closed and Brock was invited | Opening a closed (even unlocked) door satisfied statutory "force"; evidence sufficient |
| Conflict of interest (successive representation) | Prior representation of McNeil did not create an actual conflict affecting performance | Counsel previously represented McNeil; counsel should have obtained informed consent and should have challenged or more aggressively cross-examined | No actual conflict shown; counsel cross-examined McNeil vigorously; ineffective-assistance claim fails |
| Failure to move for acquittal on venue (IAC) | Counsel’s omission was not prejudicial because venue was sufficiently proven | Counsel deficient for not moving for acquittal on venue under Crim.R.29 | No deficient performance because venue was adequately proven; claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio 1997) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1997) (rational finder of fact test for sufficiency)
- State v. Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 983 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 2012) (venue may be proven by facts and circumstances; circumstantial evidence may suffice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-pronged ineffective-assistance test)
- State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1989) (application of Strickland in Ohio)
- State v. Hudson, 2018-Ohio-423, 106 N.E.3d 205 (Ohio App.) (opening a closed but unlocked entry can constitute sufficient "force" for burglary)