307 P.3d 564
Or. Ct. App.2013Background
- At ~12:06 a.m., Deschutes County deputy Brown responded to an anonymous call reporting an intoxicated man driving erratically; the caller gave a detailed physical and vehicle description.
- Brown located a parked car matching the description; license check showed the registered owner had a suspended license from a prior DUII.
- Brown saw defendant walking from a nearby condominium, illuminated him with a flashlight, and asked to talk; defendant ran back into the condo and closed the door.
- Officers knocked; a woman who rented the room answered, told them it was her party, stepped aside and motioned to the back of the room where defendant was located.
- Brown entered without a warrant, conducted sobriety testing, arrested defendant for DUII and driving while suspended; defendant later consented to a breath test showing 0.10% BAC.
- Defendant moved to suppress evidence from the warrantless entry; the trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed after a conditional guilty plea.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the renter consented to Brown’s warrantless entry into the condo | Renter voluntarily consented by stepping aside and motioning to defendant | Entry was not consensual; renter’s acquiescence was passive and insufficient | Consent was voluntary; entry lawful under consent exception |
| Whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry (alternative) | Entry would be justified by exigent circumstances and probable cause | No exigency shown to excuse lack of warrant | Court resolved case on consent; did not rely on exigent-circumstances analysis |
| Whether the officer’s words coerced consent (request vs. command) | Officer’s statement left the renter a choice; not an inevitable-entry command | Officer’s language communicated inevitability, producing mere acquiescence | Court found the officer’s words did not eliminate a reasonable choice; consent was voluntary |
| Burden of proof for warrantless-entry exception | State must prove exception by preponderance | Defendant asserts state failed to meet burden | Court concluded state met its burden to show voluntary consent |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Marshall, 254 Or. App. 419 (discusses standard for consent and review of suppression rulings)
- State v. Dahl, 323 Or. 199 (probable cause + exigent circumstances can justify warrantless entry)
- State v. Dunlap, 215 Or. App. 46 (warrantless searches and Article I, section 9)
- State v. Weaver, 319 Or. 212 (consent-search framework: authority and voluntariness)
- State v. Freund, 102 Or. App. 647 (distinguishing consent from acquiescence)
- State v. Martin, 222 Or. App. 138 (consent may be manifested by conduct)
- State v. Jepson, 254 Or. App. 290 (officer statements that remove choice produce acquiescence, not consent)
- State v. Ry/Guinto, 211 Or. App. 298 (linguistic difference between "I'd like to come in" and "I'm coming in")
