State v. Bridgeford
298 Neb. 156
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Gerard and Judith Bridgeford were charged on June 3, 2014, with multiple counts related to possession with intent to deliver marijuana. Trials were initially set for September 24, 2014.
- Both defendants repeatedly requested continuances and filed pretrial motions (notably motions to suppress filed October 6, 2014), producing multiple rescheduled status hearings and new trial dates through 2016.
- The accumulation of continuances and excludable periods moved the trial dates beyond the six-month statutory speedy-trial period in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b).
- The district court denied motions for absolute discharge, concluding the defendants permanently waived their statutory speedy-trial rights under § 29-1207(4)(b) when their requested continuances pushed trial dates past the six-month period.
- Defendants argued waiver should not apply because their continuances were for definite, reasonable purposes and not for gamesmanship; they also raised constitutional speedy-trial and due-process claims.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding statutory waiver applies regardless of the reason or definiteness of the continuance and rejecting the defendants’ constitutional and due-process claims on the record presented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants permanently waived statutory speedy-trial rights under § 29-1207(4)(b) | State: waiver occurs when a defendant-requested continuance extends trial beyond 6 months | Bridgefords: waiver should not apply because continuances were definite and reasonable (not indefinite or in bad faith) | Waiver applies: statutory waiver is triggered whenever a defendant-requested continuance moves trial beyond 6 months, regardless of reason or definiteness |
| Whether the delay violated defendants’ constitutional speedy-trial rights | State: delay attributable to defendants’ motions and actions; no constitutional violation | Bridgefords: accumulated delay (231 days after they stated readiness) violated constitutional speedy-trial and due-process rights | No constitutional violation shown; delay after readiness was not shown to have prejudiced defense; due-process claim not preserved for appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (interpreting § 29-1207(4)(b) to provide a permanent waiver when defendant continuances push trial beyond six months)
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (discussing excludable periods and waiver under the speedy-trial statute)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (same)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (concurrence prompted statutory amendment creating permanent-waiver rule)
- Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (framework for prejudice analysis in speedy-trial/delay claims)
