State v. Bridgeford
298 Neb. 156
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Gerard and Judith Bridgeford were charged with multiple counts related to possession with intent to deliver marijuana; informations filed June 3, 2014.
- Initial trial date was September 24, 2014; both defendants repeatedly moved for continuances and filed pretrial motions (notably motions to suppress filed October 6, 2014).
- Multiple status hearings and continuances followed through 2015–2016; trial ultimately set for December 12, 2016 after an April 25, 2016 status hearing where both said they were ready.
- Judith filed a motion for absolute discharge on September 9, 2016; Gerard filed the same on October 3, 2016, alleging violation of statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights.
- The district court denied both motions, concluding § 29-1207(4)(b) created a permanent statutory waiver where a defendant-requested continuance moves trial beyond the 6-month statutory period; both defendants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants permanently waived statutory speedy-trial rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) | State: defendants’ continuances moved trial beyond 6 months so waiver applies | Bridgefords: waivers should not apply because continuances were for definite periods and reasonable, not abusive | Court: Waiver provision applies whenever a defendant-requested continuance results in trial beyond 6 months, regardless of reason or whether definite |
| How to calculate the 6-month speedy-trial clock and excludable periods | State: follow statutory rules excluding filing day and listed excludable periods | Bridgefords: argued some continuances should not count or waiver should not be triggered | Court: count excludes day information filed, add statutory excludable periods; pretrial motions and continuances are excludable as specified |
| Whether post-ready delay (April 25–trial date) violated constitutional speedy-trial right | Bridgefords: 231-day delay after they were ready prejudiced their constitutional rights | State: earlier delays were defendant-caused; no prejudice shown after readiness | Court: No constitutional speedy-trial violation shown; defendants do not assert prejudice from post-ready delay |
| Whether Gerard’s due process/oppressive-delay claim was preserved | Gerard: asserted due process claim on appeal | State: claim not raised below | Court: Declined to address due process claim because it was not presented to district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Pettit v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 291 Neb. 513 (statutory interpretation review is de novo)
- State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (§ 29-1207(4)(b) provides permanent waiver regardless of definite or indefinite continuance)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (interpreting waiver provision and excludable periods)
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (same; broad reading of waiver provision)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (concurring opinion prompted legislative amendment creating waiver)
- State v. Wells, 277 Neb. 476 (rules on excludable continuances and pretrial conference exclusions)
- Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (federal precedent on speedy-trial/delay analysis)
- State v. Nadeem, 284 Neb. 513 (preservation rule: appellate courts will not consider issues not raised below)
