State v. Bridgeford
298 Neb. 156
Neb.2017Background
- Gerard and Judith Bridgeford were charged June 3, 2014 with multiple counts of possession with intent to deliver marijuana (and related aiding/abetting counts).
- Initial trial was set for September 24, 2014; both defendants repeatedly moved to continue status hearings and trial dates through a series of motions and status conferences extending into 2016.
- Both filed motions to suppress on October 6, 2014; those motions were denied January 5, 2015. Numerous later continuances were requested by the defendants for discovery and depositions.
- After stating they were ready to proceed on April 25, 2016, the court set trial for December 12, 2016. Defendants moved for absolute discharge in Sept./Oct. 2016 alleging statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations.
- The district court denied discharge, concluding under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) the defendants permanently waived the 6-month statutory speedy-trial right because their continuances moved trial dates beyond the statutory period; defendants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants permanently waived their statutory 6-month speedy-trial right under § 29-1207(4)(b) | State: waiver occurs where defendant-requested continuance moves trial date past 6 months | Bridgeford(s): waiver should not apply because continuances were for definite periods and for legitimate reasons, not bad faith | The court held waiver is automatic if a defendant-requested continuance results in a trial date beyond 6 months, regardless of motive or whether the continuance was definite or indefinite |
| Whether defendants’ constitutional speedy-trial or due process rights were violated by post-ready delay | State: no constitutional violation shown; delay before April 25 was attributable to defendants and no prejudice alleged after that date | Bridgeford(s): 231-day delay after April 25 violated constitutional speedy-trial/due process rights | The court found no merit to constitutional claims (no asserted prejudice); a separate due-process oppressive-delay claim was not preserved and thus not considered |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (2017) (interpreting § 29-1207(4)(b) to create a permanent waiver when defendant continuances push trial past six months)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (2014) (discussing excludable periods and speedy-trial computations)
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (2014) (same: treatment of excludable delays and continuances)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (2009) (concurring opinion prompted legislative amendment creating permanent-waiver language)
- State v. Wells, 277 Neb. 476 (2009) (rules on excluding continuances of pretrial conferences)
- Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) (federal authority on harmless delay and prejudice in speedy-trial context)
