State v. Bridgeford, 298 Neb. 156

Background

Gerard and Judith Bridgeford were charged in June 2014 with multiple counts related to possession and delivery of marijuana; trials were originally set for September 24, 2014.
Both defendants repeatedly moved to continue status conferences and trial dates between August 2014 and April 2016; motions included both definite and indefinite continuances and motions to suppress filed October 6, 2014.
The court repeatedly granted continuances and ultimately set trials for December 12, 2016; the defendants later moved for absolute discharge on speedy-trial grounds (statutory and constitutional).
The district court denied the motions, concluding that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) each defendant permanently waived the statutory speedy-trial right when their continuance requests moved trial dates beyond the six-month statutory period.
Defendants appealed arguing the statute’s permanent-waiver provision should not apply where continuances were for a definite period or were reasonable and not in bad faith; Gerard separately raised a due-process (oppressive delay) claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendants permanently waived statutory speedy-trial rights under § 29-1207(4)(b)	State: waiver occurs when a defendant-requested continuance extends trial beyond six months	Bridgefords: waiver should not apply because continuances were definite, reasonable, and not in bad faith	Court: Waiver is permanent whenever a defendant-requested continuance results in trial beyond six months, regardless of reason or whether definite or indefinite
Proper method to calculate the six-month speedy-trial clock	State: follow statutory method excluding filing day, count 6 months, back up 1 day, add excludable periods	Bridgefords: (implicitly) disputes application given continuances and excluded periods	Court: Confirmed calculation method and that pretrial motions/continuances create excludable periods starting at filing to final disposition or new dates as specified in § 29-1207(4)
Whether continuances must be indefinite for permanent waiver to apply	State: statute applies regardless of definiteness	Bridgefords: only indefinite continuances should trigger permanent waiver	Court: No; statute’s language is broad — definiteness is irrelevant to permanent waiver determination
Whether constitutional speedy-trial or due-process rights were violated by post-ready delay	Bridgefords: 231-day delay after April 25, 2016 (when they said ready) violated constitutional rights and Gerard claims oppressive delay	State: much delay attributable to defendants’ own motions; no prejudice shown	Court: No constitutional violation found; Gerard’s due-process (oppressive delay) argument was not preserved in district court and thus not considered on appeal

Key Cases Cited

State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (interpreting § 29-1207(4)(b) to provide for permanent waiver regardless of definite or indefinite continuance)
State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (discussing excludable periods and speedy-trial calculations)
State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (interpreting waiver language and excludable periods)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (Wright, J., concurring) (urged legislative fix to avoid gamesmanship in speedy-trial calculations)
Pettit v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 291 Neb. 513 (noting standard of statutory interpretation)
State v. Wells, 277 Neb. 476 (pretrial conference continuances excluded from speedy-trial calculation)
State v. Schmader, 13 Neb. App. 321 (definiteness requirement for continuance rulings)
State v. Dailey, 10 Neb. App. 793 (pretrial continuance/exclusion rules)
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (addressing prejudice and speedy-trial analysis)
State v. Nadeem, 284 Neb. 513 (procedural rule that issues not raised below will not be addressed on appeal)