State v. Breidt, 349 P.3d 924

Breidt was convicted in a bench trial of failure to register as a sex offender.
Breidt challenges the registration statute as applied, claiming vagueness in defining ‘change,’ ‘residence,’ ‘residence address,’ and the phrase ‘changes his or her residence address.’
The trial court’s outcome and the defense on vagueness are reviewed de novo for constitutionality.
Breidt previously resided with Chavez at a fixed address and vacated by November 1, 2012, after notice to move out.
After Breidt left, Chavez began returning Breidt’s mail; Breidt did not have a fixed residence after leaving.
The court concludes the statute’s terms and the overall phrase are sufficiently definite for a reasonable person to understand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the term 'residence address' sufficiently definite?	Breidt argues terms are vague and undefined.	Breidt contends the terms are defined by ordinary meaning and case law.	Not unconstitutionally vague; terms are sufficiently defined.

State v. Pickett, 95 Wn. App. 475 (1999) (defines ordinary meaning of 'residence' as place to which one intends to return)
State v. Jenkins, 100 Wn. App. 85 (2000) (address term defined but previously vague under older statute; homelessness considerations addressed)
State v. Morgan, 32 Wn. App. 236 (1982) (defines 'address' as mail or communications reach point; relates to former statute)
State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1 (2007) (due process requires fair notice; vagueness review framework)
State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156 (1992) (vagueness standard; burden on defendant when no First Amendment rights involved)