State v. Bray, 297 Neb. 916

Police obtained and executed a warrant targeting common areas and a roommate Gonsalves’ bedroom based on an affidavit from informant Deven Moore. The affidavit omitted that Moore was in custody and intoxicated when he gave the information.
The district court found the omission reckless under Franks and held the warrant invalid for lack of probable cause when the omitted facts were considered.
During the execution, officers observed a bong, grinder, and the smell of marijuana in Bray’s bedroom through an open doorway; Bray was not the target and was asked to stay in the living room.
Bray retrieved a charger from his room while accompanied by an officer; the officer observed the paraphernalia from the doorway but did not search further without consent.
Bray spoke privately by cell phone (stating he consulted counsel), then gave written consent after being read a form advising him of his right to refuse; officers then searched and seized additional contraband.
Bray moved to suppress; the trial court found (and the Supreme Court affirmed) that Bray’s consent was voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from the prior Fourth Amendment violation, so the evidence was admissible.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Bray)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Validity of warrant/Franks omission	Warrant affidavit omitted that informant was in custody; affidavit thus lacked probable cause	Officer relied on informant; omission not intentional	Warrant invalid—omission was reckless; no probable cause when corrected
Voluntariness of consent	Consent was coerced by detention, multiple officers, and confrontation with visible items	Consent was voluntary: conversational tone, ability to move, review of warrant, private call, written advisement	Consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances
Attenuation of consent from illegality	Consent was not sufficiently removed from the illegal entry; knowledge of prior search made refusal futile	Consent was attenuated by intervening circumstances (advisement, consultation, written form) and lack of flagrant police exploitation	Consent sufficiently attenuated; evidence admissible
Good-faith exception / officer conduct	Officer acted recklessly; cannot invoke good-faith reliance	Officer lacked intent to exploit illegality; routine precautionary measures were permissible	Good-faith exception rejected as basis, but attenuation upheld so suppression unnecessary

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (threshold showing required to obtain evidentiary hearing when affidavit contains reckless material omissions)
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (framework for attenuation analysis and burden on State to prove voluntariness and purging of taint)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (exclusionary rule and "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine)
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (purpose of exclusionary rule to deter unconstitutional police conduct)
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (attenuation factors and limits of exclusionary rule applicability)
U.S. v. Greer, 607 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 2010) (consent after consultation and advisement can attenuate prior illegality)
U.S. v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 2001) (deference to factual findings in suppression hearings)
State v. Lammers, 267 Neb. 679 (Neb. 2004) (criteria for informant reliability in warrant affidavits)
State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841 (Neb. 2010) (discussing voluntariness and attenuation under Nebraska law)