State v. Brandom Garrett
03-17-00334-CR
| Tex. App. | Jan 2, 2018Background
- Trooper Jason Nolan (13+ years DPS) observed Brandom Garrett's white F-250 on northbound I-35 on May 29, 2015; Nolan estimated Garrett was exceeding the 70 mph limit and verified 75 mph on a radar unit he regularly used and tested.
- Nolan also observed Garrett in the far left lane and concluded Garrett was not passing other vehicles for an extended interval (about 30 seconds / ~1.5 miles per Nolan’s testimony and dashcam).
- Nolan had requested and caused placement of a “Left lane for passing only” sign on that stretch; the sign was located prior to the last entrance ramp before Nolan’s position.
- Nolan stopped Garrett for speeding and for driving in the left lane without passing. Garrett moved to suppress the stop; only Nolan testified and dashcam/video and photos were admitted.
- The county court granted the motion to suppress without detailed reasoning. The State requested specific findings under Cullen and Elias; the court initially failed to make the requested essential findings, this court abated, the trial court later filed findings that the State argues are internally inconsistent and largely unfavorable but silent on many requested dispositive points.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Garrett) | Held / Trial Court action |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Reasonable suspicion to stop for speeding | Nolan’s training+visual estimate and radar confirmation (75 in 70) gave reasonable suspicion (likely probable cause) | Radar could have malfunctioned or picked another vehicle; 5 mph over was reasonable under conditions | Trial court suppressed; State argues suppression was erroneous because record supports reasonable suspicion |
| 2. Reasonable suspicion for left‑lane‑for‑passing violation | Nolan observed Garrett in left lane not passing for ~30 sec; sign was posted; under precedent officer needs only reasonable suspicion he saw sign | Garrett claimed he was passing or otherwise not blocking and thus lawful | Trial court granted suppression; State argues precedent (Jaganathan, Castillo, Earvin, etc.) supports reasonable suspicion and stop was lawful |
| 3. Sufficiency and consistency of trial court findings | State: trial court failed to make essential findings requested under Cullen/Elias and produced inconsistent findings; where findings are missing or inadequate appellate court must remand or infer findings favorable to State after opportunity to correct | Garrett: argued for suppression and the court accepted credibility/interpretation of evidence | Trial court made some findings on remand but omitted many requested dispositive factual findings; State asks this court to either reverse or abate/remand again or treat omissions as implicit findings for State |
| 4. Remedy when trial court omits essential findings | State: because it timely requested findings and court had multiple chances, omissions should be treated as implicit findings favoring State or case should be remanded for specific findings | Garrett: favors affirmance of suppression | This court previously abated; State asks reversal or further abatement/remand; trial court’s supplemental findings insufficient per State |
Key Cases Cited
- Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (officer need reasonably believe sign was seen; reasonable‑suspicion principles)
- Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (reasonable suspicion for left‑lane violation can exist despite possible defenses; officer need not weigh statutory purpose)
- State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (trial court must state essential findings when requested)
- State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (omission of findings on potentially dispositive issues requires remand for supplemental findings)
- United States v. Castillo, 804 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2015) (officer need not have certainty that driver passed sign; stops several miles past a sign upheld)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (subjective intent of officer irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis)
- Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (U.S. 2014) (reasonable‑suspicion standard described; probability threshold discussion)
- Mouton v. State, 101 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003) (upholding stop miles past a left‑lane sign)
- Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (Texas applies objective Fourth Amendment standard)
- Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (reasonable suspicion need not rule out innocent explanations)