State v. Braden (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 4204

Background

In 1999 David L. Braden was sentenced (including an order to pay court costs) after convictions affirmed on direct review; he remained indigent on death row.
R.C. 2947.23(C) took effect March 22, 2013, providing that a sentencing court “retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution … at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.”
In November 2016 Braden moved the trial court to waive or modify his court costs; the trial court denied the motion and the Tenth District affirmed, holding R.C. 2947.23(C) did not apply to convictions final before the statute’s effective date.
This Court initially issued State v. Braden (Braden I) agreeing with the Tenth District, but later granted Braden’s motion for reconsideration.
On reconsideration the Court vacated Braden I, held that R.C. 2947.23(C) authorizes trial courts to waive/suspend/modify costs imposed before the statute’s effective date, answered the certified conflict question affirmatively, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded for consideration on the merits.

Issues

Issue	Braden's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2947.23(C) authorizes a trial court to waive/suspend/modify court costs imposed before its effective date	R.C. 2947.23(C)’s plain language (“retains jurisdiction … at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter”) permits courts to act on pre‑statute judgments and provides an exception to res judicata	The statute is not expressly retroactive; courts lacked jurisdiction after final judgment and res judicata bars reopening costs imposed before the statute	Held for Braden: statute authorizes trial courts to act on costs imposed before the effective date; remanded for merits consideration
Whether application requires a retroactivity analysis	No — the statute operates on antecedent facts (unpaid costs) and does not retroactively disturb past final judgments	Because statute lacks express retroactivity, it should not be applied to preeffective judgments	Held: retroactivity analysis unnecessary; statute is not retroactive in the problematic sense because it draws on antecedent facts
Whether State v. Thompson controls or supports Braden’s position	Thompson’s reasoning (statute creating post‑sentencing remedy for jail‑time credit) is analogous and supports applying a similar post‑sentencing jurisdictional grant to pre‑effective convictions	Thompson did not decide retroactivity; it addressed finality and whether the denial was a final, appealable order	Held: Thompson is consistent and persuasive; the Court relied on the similarity of statutory language to support allowing the remedy
Separation‑of‑powers / final‑judgment concerns about reopening final sentences	Braden: R.C. 2947.23(C) addresses unpaid costs and allows discretionary relief without annulling final judgments	State / dissent: allowing courts to reopen final cost orders conflicts with separation of powers and statutes are presumed prospective absent express retroactivity	Held: Majority rejected that concern as dispositive—interpreting the statute to permit discretionary relief for outstanding/uncollectible costs; dissenters viewed separation‑of‑powers objection as dispositive

Key Cases Cited

State v. Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29 (2016) (interpreting a statute giving sentencing courts continuing jurisdiction to correct jail‑time credits and treating post‑sentencing motions as a special proceeding)
State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 (2010) (explaining courts may waive costs for indigent defendants though waiver must be requested at sentencing to avoid waiver/res judicata)
State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277 (2006) (holding defendant must request waiver of costs at sentencing or issue is waived and res judicata applies)
State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258 (2007) (reiterating that absent timely request, res judicata bars later challenges to assessed costs)
State v. Roberts, 134 Ohio St.3d 459 (2012) (statute that draws on antecedent facts need not be treated as retroactive for purposes of application to pre‑existing factual circumstances)
State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266 (2010) (separation‑of‑powers principle: legislature cannot compel reopening of final judicial judgments)