State v. Braden (Slip Opinion)
2018 Ohio 5079
Ohio2018Background
- In 1999 David Braden was sentenced (death penalty) and the trial court orally ordered fines and court costs; the formal sentencing entry did not list costs but a disposition sheet did.
- Braden’s convictions and sentences became final well before 2013; he later sought waiver of fines and court costs in 2016 asserting indigence.
- The trial court denied Braden’s postjudgment motion; the Tenth District affirmed, holding res judicata and that R.C. 2947.23(C) does not apply to judgments final before its effective date.
- R.C. 2947.23(C) (effective March 23, 2013) provides that “the court retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution … at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.”
- The question certified to the Ohio Supreme Court: whether R.C. 2947.23(C) authorizes trial courts to waive, modify, or suspend court costs imposed when the conviction and sentence were already final before March 23, 2013.
- The Supreme Court held R.C. 2947.23(C) does not revive or grant jurisdiction to revisit costs imposed before its effective date; Braden’s motion was barred by res judicata. The Court noted a clerical omission in the sentencing entry may be corrected nunc pro tunc.
Issues and Key Cases Cited
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Braden) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does R.C. 2947.23(C) permit trial courts to waive/suspend/modify court costs that were imposed before March 23, 2013? | The statute’s plain language allows waiver at any time; it supplies statutory authority to revisit pre‑existing cost orders and serves a remedial purpose. | "Retains" means the court continues to have jurisdiction only over matters it already possessed; it cannot restore jurisdiction lost before the statute; statute is prospective. | No. R.C. 2947.23(C) does not authorize revisiting costs imposed before its effective date. |
| Was Braden’s postjudgment motion to waive costs barred by res judicata because he did not seek waiver at sentencing? | The statute creates an exception permitting courts to act after sentencing; Braden should be allowed to seek relief despite finality. | Prior law required a motion at sentencing; failure to do so forfeits the claim and res judicata bars collateral attack. | Yes. Because Braden failed to seek waiver at his 1999 sentencing, res judicata bars his 2016 motion. |
| Does a sentencing entry’s omission of costs when the court orally ordered them affect validity or permit reopening? | The omission casts doubt and supports relief; courts should be able to reconsider. | Oral pronouncement plus disposition sheet reflect the court’s action; the entry omission is clerical and correctable. | The omission is a clerical error correctable by nunc pro tunc; it does not reopen the final order. |
| Should R.C. 2947.23(C) be applied retroactively to revive jurisdiction for older final judgments? | The statute’s present-tense language and remedial purpose allow its application to past final cases. | Absent express retroactivity, statutes operate prospectively; the General Assembly did not clearly make R.C. 2947.23(C) retroactive. | The statute is prospective; it does not revive jurisdiction over judgments final before March 23, 2013. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258 (2007) (defendant’s indigence does not prevent imposition of costs; waiver permitted but must be requested at sentencing)
- State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580 (2004) (statute requires assessment of costs against convicted defendants; waiver for indigents is permissive)
- State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277 (2006) (failure to move for waiver at sentencing waives the issue and res judicata bars collateral attack)
- Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427 (2014) (a sentence imposing costs is a final order)
- State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 (2010) (trial court may waive costs at sentencing; procedural requirements explained)
- State v. Thompson, 147 Ohio St.3d 29 (2016) (statute granting continuing jurisdiction over certain sentencing errors may allow post‑sentencing motions; discussed in dissent to argue analogous application)