264 So. 3d 625
La. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Darandall Boyette was tried and convicted by a jury for armed robbery with a firearm for a September 3, 2014 home invasion; sentence later enhanced to 99 years as a habitual offender.
- Victim Chastity Williams testified intruders (identified post-robbery as Boyette and Nicholas Crow) entered through a window, brandished a handgun, took cash and cell phones, and described distinctive shoes and white gloves worn by the robbers.
- Police arrested Boyette at his father Lugene’s trailer the same night; Lugene orally consented to a warrantless search, yielding six $100 bills under Boyette’s mattress and a pair of black Nike tennis shoes with white gloves in an exterior shed.
- Forensic testing found no amplifiable DNA on the shoes or gloves; a handwriting expert matched two letters (one to a judge, one to a detective) to Boyette, one admitting he “played a part” in the robbery.
- Defendant moved to suppress evidence from the consent search (arguing lack of voluntary and scope), challenged a juror for cause after a prejudicial comment, and raised sufficiency and bill-of-information/grand-jury arguments on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Boyette) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for armed robbery | Jury could reasonably find Boyette guilty based on victim ID, matching shoeprints, seized cash, and Boyette’s handwriting admissions | Victim could not positively ID masked robbers; no DNA on gloves/shoes; alternative perpetrators possible; evidence does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence | Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Validity/scope of warrantless search (consent) | Lugene, as owner/occupant, voluntarily consented to search the premises (oral consent valid); scope included shed | Consent was not voluntary or sufficiently scoped; officers entered before consent; search exceeded consent (residence vs. premises) | Affirmed denial of suppression: trial court found consent free and voluntary and scope included shed; search lawful |
| Bill of information vs. grand jury indictment for life-exposure after enhancement | Prosecution by bill of information was proper; initial charge (armed robbery with firearm) was not punishable by life so grand jury not required; habitual offender proceeding is not substantive charging instrument | Because enhanced status exposed Boyette to life, state should have indicted by grand jury at initial charging | Affirmed: error waived (no timely motion to quash); indictment requirement applies to substantive charge only; multiple-offender bill merely seeks sentencing enhancement |
| Recusal / participation by D.A.'s office personnel | Investigator’s factual-witness involvement did not violate recusal; issue not preserved | Office of the District Attorney was recused; involvement of its investigator in prosecution violated recusal | Not preserved for appeal (no contemporaneous objection); claim rejected |
| Juror misconduct / challenge for cause handling | Trial court appropriately removed the juror who made prejudicial remarks; court offered to question other jurors; defense declined further inquiry | Entire panel should have been excused or other jurors questioned because they may have heard prejudicial remarks | Not preserved for appeal: defense declined the court’s offer to question other jurors and made no contemporaneous objection |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La. 1992) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (constitutional sufficiency standard: any rational trier of fact)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (standard for voluntariness of consent to search)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (common authority to consent to search)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (objective scope of consent to search)
- Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (scope limits for searches authorized by consent)