State v. Boyd
151 A.3d 355
| Conn. | 2016Background
- Ray Boyd was convicted of murder for a crime committed at age 17 and, in 1992, sentenced to 50 years imprisonment with no parole eligibility.
- Boyd unsuccessfully appealed his conviction; his underlying facts were affirmed on appeal.
- In 2013 Boyd filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22, arguing his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and that the sentencing court failed to consider youth-related mitigating factors required by Miller v. Alabama.
- The trial court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction; the state agreed the motion initially raised a viable Miller-based claim.
- After enactment of P.A. 15-84 (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a), Boyd became eligible for parole (for sentences ≤50 years, parole eligibility after 60% served or 12 years), removing the claim that he was serving life without parole.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court, following State v. Delgado, held that because Boyd’s sentence now includes parole eligibility, Miller/Riley/Casiano do not require resentencing and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentencing is "illegal" because it was the equivalent of life without parole and the court failed to consider youth-related mitigating factors | Boyd: his 50-year, no-parole sentence violated Miller and was illegal because the court did not consider youth-related factors | State: after P.A. 15-84 Boyd is parole-eligible, so the sentence is not life without parole and Miller-based relief is inapplicable | Court: Held Boyd is now parole-eligible; Miller’s remedial rule applies only to life without parole; therefore no colorable illegal-sentence claim and no jurisdiction to correct |
| Whether a motion to correct was the proper vehicle at the time it was filed | Boyd: motion properly alleged an illegal sentence under Practice Book § 43-22 based on Miller | State: trial court initially erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction but contested continuing viability after P.A. 15-84 | Court: agreed the motion initially raised a viable claim, but subsequent statutory change eliminated the claim, divesting jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801 (Conn. 2016) (holding changed juvenile-sentencing law can divest jurisdiction for previously viable Miller claims)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; courts must consider youth-related mitigating factors when imposing life without parole)
- State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637 (Conn. 2015) (Connecticut requires consideration of age-related evidence when imposing life without parole on juvenile offender)
- Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52 (Conn. 2015) (Miller’s sentencing considerations apply retroactively in collateral proceedings)
- State v. Boyd, 36 Conn. App. 516 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (Appellate Court opinion affirming Boyd’s conviction)
