State v. Bowman
337 S.W.3d 679
| Mo. | 2011Background
- Bowman was convicted of first-degree murder for Velda Rumfelt's 1977 killing and sentenced to death following a jury recommendation.
- Two of the jury-found aggravating circumstances were based on vacated Illinois murder convictions later reversed on appeal.
- DNA evidence linked Bowman to Rumfelt's underwear; the semen DNA profile frequency was extremely small.
- Bowman had prior Illinois murder convictions (vacated on post-conviction review), which the State sought to rely on in penalty.
- The defense moved to limit victim-impact and other evidence during penalty; the trial court admitted extensive aggravating and other evidence.
- The Missouri Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the death penalty strength and ultimately reversed the death sentence on due to invalid aggravating factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNA profile admissibility under Fourth Amendment/IGPA | Bowman; Fourth Amendment and IGPA protect against disclosure of genetic data to assess a different crime. | State; lawfully obtained DNA may be used in unrelated investigations; consent for initial search does not bar later use. | Admissibility affirmed; use of lawfully obtained DNA in unrelated case does not violate Fourth Amendment/IGPA. |
| Admissibility of alternative perpetrator evidence | Bowman; evidence tying Kevin Kiger to related murders should be admitted as an alternate perpetrator. | Kiger evidence lacks direct connection to Rumfelt's murder; not admissible as direct alternative perpetrator evidence. | Trial court did not err in excluding the alternative-perpetrator evidence. |
| Sufficiency of the guilt evidence | Bowman contends evidence does not reasonably support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. | Evidence including DNA in underwear, eyewitness identification, and circumstantial factors suffices. | Guilt supported by the record; judgment of acquittal not warranted. |
| Validity of aggravating factors in penalty phase | Two vacated Illinois murders used as aggravators prejudicially influenced the penalty. | Prior convictions (even vacated) and related acts are permissible non-statutory aggravators. | Death sentence reversed because invalid weighting of vacated convictions tainted the penalty. |
| Strength of evidence for death penalty on independent review | Strength of evidence supports death given DNA and related facts. | Strength of evidence not compelling; the case warrants life imprisonment. | Court concluded the evidence was not sufficiently compelling to justify death; remanded for life imprisonment. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Granado, 148 S.W.3d 309 (Mo. banc 2004) (standard for reversing suppression rulings; de novo Fourth Amendment review)
- State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719 (Mo. banc 2007) (Fourth Amendment analysis in DNA cases; scope of consent)
- State v. Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630 (Mo. App.2009) (limited appellate review; admissibility of evidence)
- State v. Barriner, 111 S.W.3d 396 (Mo. banc 2003) (evidence of alternate perpetrators; balancing probative value vs. prejudice)
- State v. Davis, 211 S.W.3d 86 (Mo. banc 2006) (modus operandi analysis; high bar for MO evidence)
- State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. banc 1993) (moda operandi/identity evidence standards)
- State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673 (Mo. banc 2007) (limitations on weighing vacated convictions in death penalties)
- State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. banc 1998) (independent review; strength of evidence in capital cases)
- State v. Langdon, 110 S.W.3d 807 (Mo. banc 2003) (standard for reviewing guilt in capital cases; independent review requirements)
- State v. Franklin, 969 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. banc 1998) (strength of evidence as a factor in proportionality review)
- State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. banc 1984) (not excessive or disproportionate considering crime and strength of evidence)
- Gatewood, 786 F.2d 821 (8th Cir. 1986) (relationship between chain-of-custody and admissibility)
