State v. Bowers
1204010456
| Del. Super. Ct. | Jul 31, 2017Background
- On April 14, 2012, a woman leaving a Wilmington drug store was carjacked at gunpoint; a witness pursued the vehicle and police joined the chase. Police found the victim's crashed car; a toy gun and the victim's purse were inside, and officers saw a man running from the scene; that man was detained and later identified by the victim as Corey Bowers.
- At trial the State presented the victim's in-court identification, a witness who followed the car, officer testimony placing Bowers near the crash, Detective Rizzo's observations that the gun appeared freshly painted and smudges on Bowers' hands, and DNA matching Bowers to envelopes containing threatening letters sent to the victim.
- Bowers testified, admitting substance use that day and asserting he was elsewhere playing dice and merely ran from approaching traffic and officers; prior convictions were admitted for impeachment.
- After a first mistrial, Bowers was retried, convicted on multiple counts (robbery, carjacking, aggravated intimidation, terroristic threatening, misuse of mail) and sentenced to lengthy terms with various suspensions and supervision.
- Bowers filed a timely Rule 61 postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel for failing to (1) move to suppress or object to identifications, (2) adequately conduct direct examination of Bowers, and (3) object to expert-style testimony about paint/smudges. The Superior Court considered counsel’s affidavit and the record and denied relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress or objecting to the victim's out-of-court and in-court identifications? | Bowers: counsel should have suppressed or objected to identifications to prevent prejudice. | State/Trial Counsel: strategic decision; even without identifications, other strong evidence supported conviction. | Denied — Bowers failed Strickland prejudice prong; other evidence made a different result not reasonably probable. |
| 2. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for inadequate direct examination of Bowers? | Bowers: counsel abandoned him, allowing unstructured "narrative" testimony that harmed his defense. | Trial Counsel: Bowers refused to share testimony content, insisted on reading prepared narrative against counsel's advice; behavior impeded preparation. | Denied — counsel’s actions were reasonable; record shows Bowers' lack of cooperation and disruptive conduct. |
| 3. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for not objecting to expert-style testimony about paint and hand smudges? | Bowers: testimony required expert qualification; failure to object prejudiced the jury. | Trial Counsel: believed testimony was lay-observation; did object to opinion beyond observations; hindsight objection acknowledged. | Denied — testimony was admissible as lay observation; no reasonable probability an objection would have succeeded or changed outcome. |
| 4. Procedural bar: Was the Rule 61 motion barred or untimely? | Bowers: motion timely and raises ineffective-assistance claims not previously adjudicated. | State: acknowledged timeliness and allowed merits to be reached. | Court: motion timely and not procedurally barred; merits considered and denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996) (strong presumption that counsel’s representation is reasonable)
- Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1991) (Rule 61 procedural-bar principles and timeliness)
- Whittle v. State, 138 A.3d 1149 (Del. 2016) (ineffective-assistance claims excused from certain procedural defaults and discussion of when such claims may be raised)