State v. Bourn, 2022 Ohio 4321

Background

In 2005 N.J. alleged that appellee Melvin Bourn raped her; Bourn admits sexual contact but insists it was consensual and describes prior phone contacts and an invitation to her home.
A rape kit was collected in 2005 but not submitted for DNA testing until 2011; BCI produced a report in 2017 linking the kit to Bourn, and he was indicted that year (within the statute of limitations).
Bourn moved to dismiss for prejudicial preindictment delay, citing lost or unavailable evidence: phone records, an original police file, the house where the incident occurred (demolished), a closed bar, and a deceased investigator.
The trial court initially denied the motion, later granted reconsideration and dismissed the indictment; the Eighth District affirmed dismissal.
The State appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which considered whether the defendant satisfied the constitutional “actual prejudice” requirement for preindictment-delay dismissal and whether the Eighth District erred.
The Supreme Court held Jones controls, concluded Bourn failed to show actual prejudice, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Bourn)	Held
1) What standard governs a due-process claim based on preindictment delay?	Require concrete proof of substantial/non-speculative prejudice from missing evidence.	Jones standard (actual prejudice shown when missing evidence/testimony identified by defendant would minimize or eliminate the State’s evidence and bolster the defense).	Jones is controlling: defendant must show actual prejudice—missing evidence/testimony would (not could/might) minimize/eliminate the State’s evidence and bolster the defense.
2) Does the defendant bear initial burden to show actual prejudice and then shift burden to the State?	The State urges a stricter requirement for the defendant to prove prejudice.	Bourn relies on established burden-shifting framework (defendant first shows actual prejudice; then state must justify delay).	The Court reaffirmed the framework: defendant must present evidence of actual prejudice first; only then does burden shift to the State to explain delay.
3) Were the specific missing items (phone records, case file, demolished house, closed bar, deceased investigator) sufficient to show actual prejudice?	Argues Eighth Dist. set too low a bar and allowed speculative claims; seeks reversal of dismissal.	Argues the missing records (especially phone records) would have corroborated consent and impeached the victim.	Court held Bourn’s claims were speculative or attenuated: he did not prove the records existed or that they would have eliminated the State’s evidence; therefore no actual prejudice shown.
4) Remedy and disposition	Preserve prosecution (State).	Maintain dismissal (Bourn).	Reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal and remanded to trial court for further proceedings.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Jones, 69 N.E.3d 688 (Ohio 2016) (articulates the controlling actual-prejudice standard: missing evidence/testimony identified by the defendant must have "would" minimized or eliminated the State's evidence and bolstered the defense)
State v. Luck, 472 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio 1984) (held that death of an identified eyewitness who could verify defendant's self-defense claim constituted actual prejudice)
State v. Walls, 775 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2002) (rejected speculative claims of prejudice from lost evidence after lengthy delay)
State v. Adams, 45 N.E.3d 127 (Ohio 2015) (defendant failed to identify how missing/deceased-witness evidence would have been exculpatory; fading memory alone insufficient)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1971) (Supreme Court precedent requiring actual prejudice and governmental intent to gain tactical advantage for due-process dismissal)
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1977) (explains that prejudice alone is necessary but not sufficient; unconstitutional delay requires departures from fundamental fairness and often deliberate government conduct)