State v. Bonilla, 358 Or. 475

Background

Officers investigated a parolee at a converted garage dwelling; Dabbs led officers into the dwelling and opened the interior door after telling Crowe police wanted to talk.
Officers encountered Crowe, defendant, and Bull (grandmother). Bull admitted smoking marijuana and produced a bag; an officer asked to “check to make sure” no more drugs were present.
In a bedroom Bull shared with defendant, the officer opened a wooden box on a headboard and found baggies of crystalline residue; Bull said the box wasn’t hers and named her daughter (defendant) as the likely owner.
After telling defendant what was found, the officer obtained defendant’s consent to search the bedroom and found additional contraband. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine.
Defendant moved to suppress under Article I, § 9 (Oregon Constitution); trial court denied suppression, Court of Appeals reversed as to the wooden box search, and the State sought review in the Oregon Supreme Court.
The State advanced a new “apparent authority” consent theory (based on Illinois v. Rodriguez) and, at oral argument, a broader “reasonableness” theory challenging Oregon’s warrant-preference approach; the Court considered and rejected those theories.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Bonilla)	Held
Whether Bull had authority to consent to opening the wooden box	Bull’s shared occupancy of the bedroom implied authority to consent to search bedroom contents, so consent was valid	No evidence Bull had joint access or control over the box itself; she lacked authority to consent to search the box	The evidence was insufficient to show Bull had actual authority to consent to search the box; warrantless search invalid
Whether "apparent authority" (police reasonable belief in consenter’s authority) is available under Article I, § 9	Rodriguez-based apparent authority should validate searches when officers reasonably but mistakenly believe consenter had authority	Article I, § 9 requires consent by someone with actual authority or agency-based authority; officer’s reasonable mistake cannot substitute	Rejected: apparent authority under Rodriguez does not satisfy Article I, § 9 consent exception; state failed to show authority
Whether defendant’s subsequent consent was an attenuation of unlawful search or tainted by the unlawful box search	Defendant consented voluntarily after being informed; that consent validated later bedroom search	Defendant’s consent was the unattenuated fruit of the prior unlawful search and therefore tainted	Court of Appeals’ suppression of evidence found in the subsequent bedroom search was affirmed (consent was tainted)
Whether Oregon should abandon its warrant-preference/categorical-exceptions approach for a purely reasonableness-based test	State urged the Court to evaluate searches solely on whether the officer’s conduct was reasonable given facts known at the time	Defendant relied on established Oregon precedent treating warrantless searches as per se unreasonable absent a recognized exception	Court declined to reconsider longstanding Article I, § 9 framework; the state’s new reasonableness theory was insufficiently developed to overturn precedent

Key Cases Cited

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (U.S. 1990) (apparent authority doctrine under the Fourth Amendment)
State v. Carsey, 295 Or. 32 (Or. 1982) (third-party consent requires actual authority based on joint access/control)
State v. Weaver, 319 Or. 212 (Or. 1994) (state must prove consent given by someone having authority; scope of consent determined by consenting party)
State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231 (Or. 1988) (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable absent narrow, established exceptions)
State v. Baker, 350 Or. 641 (Or. 2011) (emergency-aid exception requires objectively reasonable belief based on articulable facts)
State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 (Or. 1981) (voluntariness of consent assessed under totality of the circumstances)