State v. Bolton
2017 SD 94
| S.D. | 2017Background
- Defendant Clint Bolton pleaded no contest to disorderly conduct (class 2 misdemeanor) under a plea agreement; the State recommended a 30-day jail sentence with all 30 days suspended.
- Magistrate court imposed a 30-day sentence but suspended execution conditioned on Bolton obeying laws and remaining on good behavior for six months; defense objected immediately.
- Defense argued the court lacked authority to condition a suspended execution of sentence for a period longer than the statutory maximum jail term (30 days) for the offense.
- Magistrate and circuit courts upheld the suspension, relying on State v. Macy, and Bolton sought intermediate appeal; the appeal presented the question whether courts may suspend execution of sentence for periods exceeding the statutory maximum term.
- The Supreme Court addressed mootness (public interest exception) and proceeded to decide whether the Constitution or statutes limit a court’s authority to set the duration of suspended execution of sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a sentencing court may conditionally suspend execution of a sentence for a period longer than the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for the offense | The State argued courts have discretion (and relied on Macy) to set suspension periods beyond statutory maximums | Bolton argued no statute or case authorizes suspending execution for longer than the maximum term; such sentences are illegal | Court held courts may conditionally suspend execution for periods exceeding the statutory maximum because Article V, §5 delegates suspension authority to courts and SDCL 23A-27-18 imposes no time limit; unreasonable suspensions remain subject to abuse-of-discretion review |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743 (S.D. 1987) (held courts have discretion to set probation periods beyond statutory maximum when statute grants express authority over probation period)
- State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (S.D. 1985) (explained that before 1972 courts lacked inherent authority to suspend sentences absent legislative grant)
- State ex rel. Grant v. Jameson, 17 N.W.2d 714 (S.D. 1945) (discussed pre-1972 constitutional provision delegating suspension authority to the Legislature)
- State v. Rice, 877 N.W.2d 75 (S.D. 2016) (noted that unreasonable sentences are reviewable as abuse of discretion)