State v. Bollinger
302 Kan. 309
Kan.2015Background
- Brent Bollinger set fire to the marital home on October 13, 2011; his wife, Brenna, and their young son Bryson were in the house; Brenna died and Bryson and Bollinger suffered severe burns.
- Bollinger owned the house prior to the marriage; Brenna had moved in and later filed for divorce and obtained ex parte temporary orders granting her temporary exclusive possession of the marital residence.
- Bollinger was criminally charged with first‑degree murder (premeditated or felony murder), aggravated arson (alleging another person had an interest in the dwelling), and aggravated child endangerment; a jury convicted him on felony murder, aggravated arson, and aggravated child endangerment.
- On appeal Bollinger challenged: (1) sufficiency of evidence that "any interest" existed in the dwelling; (2) vagueness of the arson statute; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; and (4) admission of out‑of‑court statements (hearsay).
- The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the record, concluded Brenna had a cognizable legal interest (marital/inchoate rights, temporary exclusive possession/leasehold‑type interest), rejected the vagueness challenge as applied, found no prosecutorial misconduct, and held the hearsay objections were unpreserved.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: "any interest" element of arson | State: evidence (marital residence, temporary exclusive possession, inchoate probate/divorce interests) sufficed to prove another had an interest | Bollinger: house was solely his property; State failed to prove Brenna had any legal interest | Held: Evidence supported a reasonable inference Brenna had a cognizable interest (marital inchoate rights, temporary exclusive possession/tenancy at sufferance); conviction upheld |
| Statute vagueness ("any interest") | State: statute reasonably construed; applied here to ordinary legal interests | Bollinger: phrase is overbroad/vague, could criminalize many lawful burnings; lacks notice | Held: Not unconstitutionally vague as applied; statute gives fair warning and guards against arbitrary enforcement in this context |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (closing) | State: prosecutor invited jury to listen and draw reasonable inferences from 911 recording | Bollinger: prosecutor commented on facts not in evidence (identifying scream as Brenna) | Held: No misconduct—argument asked jury to draw reasonable inferences from evidence and recording; not improper |
| Admission of out‑of‑court statements (hearsay) | State: proffered statements to show state of mind and other exceptions | Bollinger: admission of hearsay statements violated his rights | Held: Issue not preserved—defense made only a general/continuing objection, which did not preserve specific hearsay objections for appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Boone, 277 Kan. 208 (explaining that "any interest" expanded protected property interests under arson statute)
- State v. Parrish, 205 Kan. 33 (construing earlier arson requirement as fee ownership)
- State v. Crosby, 182 Kan. 677 (mortgagee interest did not suffice under prior statute)
- State v. Houck, 240 Kan. 130 (mortgagee/insurer interest not within arson statute despite later amendments)
- State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633 (no requirement defendant knew identity of persons with property interest)
- State v. Schumacher, 298 Kan. 1059 (prosecutor may ask jury to compare/interpret sounds on recording; allowed reasonable inferences)
- State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489 (standard for sufficiency review)
