State v. Bolding, 227 Ariz. 82

Bolding was convicted by a December 2008 jury on two counts of fraudulent schemes and artifices and one count of obstructing a criminal investigation, with offenses spanning 1991–2004.
Bolding absented himself at the verdict announcement; a warrant issued, he was arrested in June 2009, and appeared June 23, 2009.
He was sentenced October 13, 2009, and moved to vacate convictions under Rule 24.2 due to sentence potential exceeding thirty years and an eight-person jury verdict.
The trial court’s order vacating the convictions was appealed by the State, but jurisdiction was revested to consider the Soliz-related implications; the case was stepped for a new sentencing hearing.
On March 1, 2010, Bolding was resentenced with modified terms; he timely appealed, triggering the § 13-4033(C) issue about sentencing delay caused by absconding.
The statute § 13-4033(C) became effective September 26, 2008, and is challenged for retroactive application to a pre-effective-date offense, with Soto I/II shaping preliminary retroactivity questions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 13-4033(C) apply to Bolding given offenses occurred before its effective date?	Bolding argues Soto I precludes retroactive application.	The State contends the statute applies to post-enactment delays, irrespective of offense date.	Yes, statute applies, but constitutional application depends on waiver; ultimately statute not retroactively operative for Bolding.
Is § 13-4033(C) retroactive as applied to Bolding’s case?	Bolding argues it disturbs vested rights and is retroactive in effect.	State contends it regulates post-enactment conduct and does not disturb vested rights.	Not retroactive as applied to Bolding; it governs conduct after the statute’s effective date.
Is the absence informing Bolding of potential appeal waiver required for constitutional application?	Bolding asserts lack of warning invalidates waiver theory.	State argues absence could support implied waiver if properly warned.	Statute constitutional only if defendant was informed of potential appeal-forfeiture; here, no warning, so cannot apply to Bolding.

State v. Soto, 223 Ariz. 407, 224 P.3d 223 (App. 2010) (Soto I – held § 13-4033(C) did not apply retroactively to absconding pre-effective offenses; noted retroactivity questions later addressed by Soto II.)
State v. Soto, 225 Ariz. 532, 241 P.3d 896 (2010) (Soto II – Supreme Court vacated Soto I and discussed applicability/retroactivity, declining to rule on constitutional retroactivity; remanded for analysis.)
State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 141 P.3d 368 (2006) (Statutory interpretation and de novo review of constitutional questions.)
Garcia v. Browning, 214 Ariz. 250, 151 P.3d 533 (2007) (Retroactivity framework; primary vs. secondary conduct for retroactivity analysis.)
Montes, 226 Ariz. 194, 245 P.3d 879 (2011) (Retroactivity considerations related to legislative changes; upheld prospective application to avoid vesting rights disturbance.)
State v. Glasscock, 168 Ariz. 265, 812 P.2d 1083 (App. 1990) (Defines final judgment timing and appeal timing in Arizona criminal appeals.)